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THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN
NADAV SHOKED†
ABSTRACT
Property is closely associated with freedom. Following the demise
of the feudal property system, property ownership in Anglo-American
law came to imply an individual’s freedom to act as she pleases on her
land. For their part, modern property theories—whether right-based,
utilitarian, or relational—employ the normative value of freedom to
justify ownership. Courts and scholars have always acknowledged the
fact that this freedom of the owner cannot be absolute: an owner’s
freedom to do as she pleases on her land is often limited to protect
other owners. However, the consensual assumption remains that an
owner is not subject to affirmative duties. She is free, according to
conventional wisdom, to choose to do nothing with her property. This
Article argues that this assumption is simply wrong. Owners are not
free to ignore their land. Property law has always subjected them to
an obligation to maintain their land up to a specific standard. This
obligation, dubbed here “the duty to maintain,” is enforced through
an array of legal rules and practices. This Article chronicles these
rules and practices for the first time, classifying them in accordance
with the enforcement mechanism they employ. It then justifies these
diverse rules and practices—and the general duty to maintain—in
light of the different theories of property. In this fashion, this Article
illustrates that ownership, both as a legal institution and as a
normative concept, inherently and inevitably incorporates a duty to
maintain.
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INTRODUCTION
Property is freedom. Property ownership conveys on the owner
independence, autonomy, and privacy; it cordons off a slice of the
world and designates the owner as its master. Philosophers and
economists, judges and laypeople, legal scholars and political
scientists, varied as their ideological and methodological predilections
may be, all ground property—even if to shifting degrees and for
1
different reasons—in freedom. The rules of Anglo-American
property law seemingly vindicate their position: once Jane becomes
Blackacre’s owner, Jane is free to set the blueprint for Blackacre’s use
2
and development. True, Jane’s freedom as an owner can never be
3
absolute. There are activities that the law prohibits her from freely
undertaking on Blackacre. She may be found liable if, for example,
4
she constructs an artificial reservoir. She may be barred from

1. See infra Part I.A–C.
2. See infra Part I.A; see also SIMON GARDNER & EMILY MACKENZIE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAND LAW 181 (3d ed. 2012) (“[The] paradigm idea of ownership” is
“dominium,” which “supposes that an owner has rights to do anything he likes with the ‘owned’
asset.”).
3. GARDNER & MACKENZIE, supra note 2, at 190–92.
4. Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 (H.L.) 339 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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establishing a factory. Moreover, the law may force Jane to allow
others to enter, or stay in, Blackacre. She may, for example, be
enjoined to permit patrons of all races to frequent the restaurant she
6
operates on Blackacre. She may be ordered to share Blackacre with
7
her former spouse. But in one very important respect Jane is still
completely free as Blackacre’s owner. Jane may be banned from
establishing a factory on Blackacre, but she cannot be forced to install
8
one. Her desire to exclude diners of a specific racial group from her
Blackacre restaurant may be thwarted, but she cannot be required to
9
launch a restaurant. Legal writers view these freedoms as instances of
a general freedom accorded to Jane: as Blackacre’s owner, she can
10
simply decide to do nothing on, or with, Blackacre. In the eloquent
terms employed by legal scholars, ownership incorporates a right to
11
12
“let [the property] lie fallow,” or “gather dust.”
But does property ownership indeed encompass this right?
At the time of this Article’s publication, properties are offered
13
for sale in Detroit, Michigan, for one dollar. Assets languish on the

5. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388–90 (1926).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
7. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34–23 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).
8. Cf. Vernon Park Realty Inc. v. Mt. Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519 (N.Y. 1954) (holding
unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited an owner from using one specific property for any
purpose but parking).
9. Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220–21 (1971) (approving decision to close pools
rather than desegregate them).
10. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 5 (1997) (“[P]roperty is the right to
determine how particular things will be used.”); Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case
for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (2006) (“[O]wnership
importantly encompasses the prerogative to use or not use the land as one pleases.”); A.M.
Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 118 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)
(arguing that the liberty to waste the thing owned is one of the incidents of “ownership”);
Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122
YALE L.J. 1444, 1449–50 (2013) (“[O]wnership . . . is an office dedicated to a specific task—
setting the agenda for [the use of] a thing.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 2061, 2067 (2012) (“The first [prerogative of ownership] is the recognition . . . that
the owner exercises residual managerial authority over the owned object.” (emphasis omitted));
Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939)
(listing six rights as constituting ownership, among them four that incorporate the freedom to
not use the property: the right to use, the right to enjoy its fruit, the right to destroy, and the
right to injure the property).
11. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 62 (1995).
12. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 389 (2010).
13. For current listings, see Detroit Real Estate, REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/
realestateandhomes-search/Detroit_MI/type-single-family-home,condo-townhome-row-homeco-op,multi-family-home/price-na-101/sby-1?pgsz=50 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
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market only if they are over-priced, implying that the fair market
14
value of these specific properties is negative. If ownership includes
the right to let property lie fallow or gather dust, this fact is baffling.
To be valued at less than zero, the property must not only be
valueless. It must do worse than offer no conceivable economic
15
benefit. Negative-value property must carry actual duties for its
owner. Yet the only involuntary affirmative duty acknowledged as
affixed to ownership—the administrative duty to pay property
taxes—cannot burden a valueless property: taxes are calculated as a
16
percentage of the property’s value. The anomaly of the negative
valuation of these Detroit properties can only be explained if
nonadministrative duties inherent to ownership itself burden all
property owners. That is, if ownership does not incorporate a right to
“let [the property] lie fallow” or “gather dust.”
This Article shows that ownership indeed does not include such a
right. Rebutting scholars’ proclamations, this Article concludes that
property law does not—and never did—afford the owner the freedom
to do nothing with her land, and that furthermore, it should not afford
that freedom to her. Rather, for weighty normative reasons,
ownership contains an affirmative duty to keep land in good repair, a
duty that forces owners to engage in certain activities on their land
regardless of their own desires. This Article dubs this duty “the duty
to maintain.” This duty to maintain is enforced through disparate
legal means, ranging in the intensity of their impact. Sometimes, when
the most extreme of these means are applied, the duty gives rise to a
state of affairs in which property not only fails to equate with the
owner’s freedom, but becomes freedom’s antithesis: ownership
amounts to coercion. A property owner is less free than a nonowner.
Jane may find herself subject to a legal duty she cannot shed as long

14. For an early report indicating the lengthy period such properties spend on the market,
see Detroit Homes Still Selling for $1, THE DAILY CALLER, Nov. 1, 2012, http://dailycaller.com/
2012/11/01/detroit-homes-still-selling-for-1.
15. Certain properties in the distressed city of Detroit may indeed offer no conceivable
economic benefit. Detroit filed for bankruptcy protection in July 2013. In re City of Detroit,
Mich., No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 4761053, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
16. MICH. CONST. art. IX § 3. The provision also mandates that property be re-assessed at
the time of its transfer, thereby assuring the purchaser that she will not be charged property
taxes based on an older, and outdated, appraisal of the land’s value. This result is highly unlikely
regardless, as statutes provide for an annual reassessment of all properties. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 211.10(1) (West 2005). Other government charges are assessed based on consumption.
Though Detroit imposes a fixed fee for water and sewer services, an owner who is not leasing a
residential unit can discontinue service. DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE § 56-4-2 (2013).
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as she owns Blackacre, while at the same time, she cannot rid herself
17
of the legal status of owner. This is precisely the predicament
trapping the owners of the Detroit one-dollar assets.
How does law impose this liability on owners in Detroit and
elsewhere? How does it render erroneous the prevalent academic
perception that owners enjoy the freedom to let their property lie
fallow or gather dust? What elements of law have academic writers
been missing? Law imposes inescapable liabilities on owners through
a myriad of rules. For example, an owner might be liable in tort law to
18
trespassers injured on her land. An owner might be liable in
nuisance law to neighbors if strangers use her property for illegal
19
activities. An owner might be subject to a common-law duty to
20
support adjoining lands. An owner might be bound to keep the
property livable as long as a tenant occupies it, with limited rights to
21
ever terminate that tenancy. An owner might be forced to buy
22
unauthorized improvements to her land made by a stranger.
Although most of these rules are well established in law—indeed,
many have existed in Anglo-American property law for centuries—
scholars have overlooked them in this context as they formally
address disparate social ills that are unrelated to an owner’s right to
let her land lie fallow or gather dust. These rules’ declared purposes
are distinct and evince little intention to disturb an owner’s freedom
of inaction: they are concerned, for example, with privileging
23
24
possessors of land over landowners, remedying physical injuries,
25
combatting illegal activities, or shielding adjacent lands from
17. In American law land cannot be abandoned. E.g., Walker v. Polk, 44 So. 2d 477, 485
(Miss. 1950) (en banc) (“[T]he common-law rule prevails that save as to easements, or licenses
or mere equities, abandonment is not effective to divest the title to real estate . . . .” (quoting
Meyerkort v. Warrington, 19 So. 2d 433, 435 (Miss. 1944))).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. Protections for improving trespassers against owners formally protect bona-fide
unauthorized possessors. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1857–58 (2009).
24. Tort liability toward trespassers and others is meant to deter against, and compensate
for, physical injuries. MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: ESSENTIALS 42–43 (2008).
25. Owners’ liability for illegal activities on their lands serves to lower crime rates. Kellner
v. Cappellini, 516 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830–31 (Civ. Ct. 1986) (noting that “[t]he use of real property
for illegal purposes such as the sale and use of illegal drugs if left unchecked will . . . increas[e]
the crime rate in the area”).
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26

collapse. Therefore, never before have these rules been considered
as forming part of one legal concept. Yet they all forcefully direct an
owner toward one action: to maintain her property up to a specific,
legally defined, standard.
27
As this Article shows, there is an abundance of such rules.
Separately and in tandem, they create an affirmative duty inherent to
28
property law; they establish this Article’s duty to maintain. By
introducing this new unitary concept, this Article facilitates an
informed and consistent assessment of the normative worth of each
individual rule instituting a duty to maintain. Furthermore, through
this exercise this Article promotes a new, and improved,
understanding of the legal notion and social function of ownership. In
influential works authored during and since the closing decade of the
twentieth century, legal scholars have provided a richer and more
29
accurate understanding of the rules and roles of property law. As
Professor Joseph Singer clarified, property is not only about rights,
30
but also about obligations. Much attention has accordingly been paid
to obligations, such as those mentioned in the opening paragraph of
this Introduction, that force an owner to refrain from certain activities

26. Owners must provide support to adjacent lands as every landowner holds the “right to
have the soil in its natural condition supported.” 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, SECOND
THOMAS EDITION § 69.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 1998).
27. In an upcoming Article, I will show that the duty extends beyond land ownership to
water and mineral rights, personal property, and intellectual property.
28. Recent and influential articles deal with the owner’s right to destroy her property, Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005), and to abandon it,
Strahilevitz, supra note 12; Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 191 (2010). They do not deal, however, with an owner’s freedom, or lack thereof, to
neglect, which is this Article’s contribution. The duty to maintain is distinct from rights to
destroy or abandon, because law treats the duty separately and it raises different (though
sometimes related) normative concerns. See infra Part II.C.
29. Examples of this scholarship include GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY &
PROPRIETY: THE COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (1997);
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER (2003);
Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003); Nestor M. Davidson,
Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008); Lee Anne
Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001); Eduardo M. Peñalver,
Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005); Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897 (2007); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1691 (2012).
30. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16–18
(2000).
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31

on her land, or from excluding particular persons from entering it.
Yet to the very limited extent that property law’s affirmative
obligations have been explored, scholars have either claimed that
these obligations attach to the ownership of assets of exceptional
32
33
social importance, such as heritage buildings or inns, or that they
34
amount to mere aspiration in an era of environmental degradation.
This Article argues instead that property contains a general,
persistent, ancient, and expanding affirmative duty to maintain an
owned asset. The presence of such an intrusive obligation, in an
institution supposedly dedicated to freedom, challenges our
understanding of that institution. Ever since the dawn of the liberal
age, thinkers have celebrated ownership as providing owners with
freedom from the dictates of others. Accordingly they have
condemned the attachment of affirmative obligations to ownership as
smacking of feudal landholding notions, which conflated economic
35
relations with personal obligations. The duty to maintain, as
uncovered in this Article, unsettles this tenet of faith, for as this
Article contends, property law’s duty to maintain is not the result of a
series of historical mishaps or of defunct, feudal, legal reasoning.
Rather, the duty flows directly from the different justifications for
ownership that have animated property law’s concern with the
institution since the inception of the modern age.
The duty to maintain is normatively warranted, as it always
represents an arrangement among property-interest holders. This
arrangement can take one of three forms. First, some legal rules
instituting the duty to maintain reflect an actual or implied
arrangement between current or antecedent neighbors that was freely
reached at some point, even though that point might only be found in
36
the distant past. Second, a larger group of legal rules imposes the
duty on neighbors as a legally constructed arrangement whereby they
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. E.g., David Lametti, The Concept of Property, 53 U. TORONTO L. J. 325, 354 (2003).
33. E.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1290–93
(1996) (chronicling the special duties placed on innkeepers and common carriers, including
heightened duties to protect their premises due to the premises’ public importance).
34. John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1986);
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND
PERSPECTIVES 15, 39–44 (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998).
35. See infra Part I.C.
36. These rules include, for example, the laws respecting affirmative covenants and those
respecting the maintenance of easements (such as rights of way). For a full discussion of these
examples and all the other similar rules, see infra Part III.A.
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all agree to maintain their lands, because collective-action problems
block the neighbors themselves from attaining this mutually and
37
socially beneficial arrangement. Third, a few legal rules insert the
duty into existing arrangements whose terms create a relationship of
dependence between property-interest holders whereby one unfairly
38
exploits the other by not maintaining the land. Enforcement of each
of these three incarnations of the maintenance obligation is inherent
to the normative notion of ownership according to at least one of the
three major property theories—right-based, utilitarian, or relational.
Hence, the same normative theories that endorse property and
celebrate the institution’s capacity to ensure freedom actually
justify—nay, necessitate—the placement on owners of affirmative
duties to maintain.
The failure to coherently acknowledge this normative and
doctrinal reality has carried tangible and troubling costs for American
law. For example, in the aftermath of the housing market’s collapse in
2008, states and localities moved to enforce vacant property
maintenance codes against lenders who own mortgage interests in
39
abandoned houses. When banks challenge such practices, courts
often accept their arguments, believing that these new laws contradict
traditional notions regarding a property-interest holder’s freedom to
40
let her asset lie fallow or gather dust. In fact, however, these
measures, geared toward remedying the devastating neighborhood
and social costs of neglect and foreclosure, merely reincarnate
entrenched principles of property law embodied in the duty to
maintain. Moreover, they are wholly justifiable based on the duty’s
normative standing. Judges ignore this fact due to a scholarly
unawareness of the duty to maintain. This Article, demonstrating that
the duty to maintain is and should be a component of property
holding, ought to cure this oversight.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the concern of
diverse property theories—grouped into three archetypes: rightbased, utilitarian, and relational—with freedom. It illustrates the key
role attributed to freedom, that is, the owner’s liberty to act as she
37. These rules include, for example, an owner’s duties in negligence and nuisance, as well
as the laws of adverse possession. For a full discussion of these examples and all the other
similar rules, see infra Part III.B.
38. These rules are mostly those applicable in the landlord–tenant relationship. For a full
discussion, see infra Part III.C.
39. See infra note 360.
40. See infra note 362.
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pleases on her land, in justifying property. It then explores the nature
of the limits the disparate property theories presently acknowledge as
placed on such freedom. Part I finds that although theorists realize
that an owner’s freedom to act as she pleases is never absolute, they
mostly assume that in the postfeudal Anglo-American world, the
owner enjoys a complete freedom to refrain from engaging in an
activity on her land, unless she is subject to a specific contractual duty
demanding otherwise. Part I concludes by demonstrating how this
assumption has, over the past few years, affected the judicial
approach to the imposition of duties on mortgage lenders.
Part II then reveals that the assumption that the owner enjoys a
freedom to refrain from action is misleading—that such a freedom
does not exist even in current, postfeudal, property law. It presents
the disparate legal rules that place on an owner a duty to maintain her
land even if she herself never entered a contract to that effect. Part II
offers a taxonomy of these rules based on the enforcement
mechanism they employ, either financial liability or loss of land. It
concludes by summarizing the standing in property law of the duty to
maintain and its relationship to the owner’s right (or lack thereof) to
abandon or destroy her property.
Part III constructs explanations for the various rules exposed in
Part II as forming property law’s duty to maintain. Three rationales
for the duty to maintain are developed, drawing on each of the three
property theories reviewed in Part I. Finally, to illustrate the practical
implications of its theoretical findings, Part III concludes by revisiting
the debate over lenders’ duties in foreclosure, introduced earlier in
Part I.
I. CURRENT PROPERTY THEORY: OWNERSHIP AS FREEDOM FROM
DUTIES TO ACT
A. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Property Theories
This Article’s main contribution is highlighting and explaining
the freedom-depriving function of property. To grasp the challenge to
common scholarly thinking this contribution portends, it is necessary
to first appreciate the central role legal and philosophical theories
attach to freedom in constructing the notion of property. Thus, this
opening Part surveys the different ways in which all major property
theories celebrate the owner’s freedom on her land, and more
prominently, the owner’s immunity from others’ commands to act on
her land. The major property theories are grouped into three
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archetypes: right-based, utilitarian, and relational. This Part briefly
surveys each archetype and the manner in which it grounds property
in the owner’s freedom.
1. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Right-Based Property
Theories. Right-based arguments constitute the first archetype of
property theories. A right-based property theory takes an individual’s
interest as sufficient moral justification for holding others under a
41
duty to respect private property. The particular individual interest
that can justify property differs across right-based justifications for
property. But the owner’s freedom is central to all—whether they are
Kantian, libertarian, Lockean, or Hegelian. Kantian and libertarian
accounts are the most extreme in this regard. According to Kant, the
establishment of the legal institution of property is rooted in the
42
innate right to freedom. Kant defines freedom as “independence
43
from being constrained by another’s choice.” Freedom is the
requirement that no other person be able to tell an individual what
44
purposes to pursue. To effectuate this innate capacity for choice
immune from the interference of others, external objects of choice
45
must be accessible to the individual. Therefore, each person must
have an entitlement to external objects: a right rendering an object
46
available for the exclusive exercise of her capacity for choice. In
other words, holding an asset, whose manner of use cannot be
dictated to the individual by others, is a prerequisite for the
individual’s freedom.
Libertarian theories rely heavily on this argument, eventually
equating property with freedom. In libertarianism the privateproperty regime is justified as the only regime that both sustains and
47
is sustained by the owner’s free actions. Property presents the most
effective constraint on the ability of outsiders—most notably, the
48
government—to interfere with individual freedom. By dispersing the
41. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 87 (1988).
42. Ernest Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 795, 801 (2003).
43. IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in IMMANUEL KANT: PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 353, 393 (Cambridge ed. 1996).
44. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM 14, 34 (2009).
45. KANT, supra note 43, at 419.
46. Weinrib, supra note 42, at 806.
47. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM xiii (1999) (arguing that
liberty is “inconceivable” without property).
48. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 59.
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ability to freely act on resources among many owners, the privateproperty regime prevents one decisionmaker from monopolizing
49
power. Conversely, an interference with the individual owner’s
freedom—forcing her to use her property in a certain manner—
50
amounts to exacting forced labor from her. This leads libertarians to
demand full respect of the owner’s autonomy to do, or not do, as she
pleases with her property.
Though other right-based property theories do not ground
property primarily in freedom, and are often able to steer clear of
libertarian conclusions, they too hold that ownership serves values of
autonomy and self-determination. Locke’s highly influential right51
based theory locates ownership’s source in labor. Subject to certain
provisos, it awards ownership to the person who labored on the
52
resource. After property is acquired in this fashion, Locke’s theory
stresses the owner’s freedom to act on the land that is now hers.
Through labor, the individual gains absolute control over the asset
53
“that another can no longer have any right to,” and from which “the
54
common right of other Men” is excluded. Mixing one’s labor with an
external object results in the freedom to decide whether to act, or not
act, on the object.
Similar to the Lockean labor theory, Hegelian property theories
55
do not ground property in freedom per se. Rather, they associate
56
property with the individual’s personality or personhood. Yet, like
all other right-based property theories, they too eventually insist on
the owner’s isolation from the decrees of others. For Hegelians, the
person can become a real self only through relationships with external
57
objects. Individuals “need to be able to ‘embody’ the freedom of

49. RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 139 (1998).
50. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 167–72 (1974).
51. On Locke’s impact in America, see generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION
IN AMERICA (1955).
52. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
University Press 1988) (1690).
53. Id. § 26.
54. Id. § 27.
55. On Hegelian theories and their contemporary relevance, see generally Margaret Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
56. Hegel’s ideas thus differ from Kant’s. See Alan Brudner, Private Law and Kantian
Right, 61 U. TORONTO L. J. 279, 310–11 (2011) (observing that the Hegelian system is distinct
from the Kantian system, as Kant theorized that “private rights to external things are
provisional and displaceable by public right—that all conclusive right is public right”).
57. G. W. F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 44, at 155 (S.W. Dyde trans. 1896).
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their personalities in external objects so that their conceptions of
themselves as persons . . . become concrete and recognizable . . . in a
58
public and external world.” Because the external object embodies
the individual’s personality or free will, the individual should have the
right to control that external object. Interferences with the owner’s
relationship with, or decisions respecting, her external objects are a
denial of the owner’s personhood. For personhood theories, as for the
freedom-based Kantian property theories, property crystalizes into
59
the “first embodiment of freedom.”
2. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Utilitarian Property
Theories. For different reasons, all right-based property theories
highlight property’s function in enabling individual freedom and in
barring outsiders from dictating a course of action to the individual
owner. Utilitarian justifications for property, which represent the
second archetype of property theories, likewise celebrate property’s
capacity to promote freedom.
Utilitarian theories are not interested in freedom as a right.
Indeed, the distinction between right-based and utilitarian theories is
the latter’s refusal to recognize a single individual aim—say,
60
freedom—as a basis for moral constraints. Rather, in the utilitarian
worldview, the foundation for an institution must be its capacity to
serve a social aim. In the most prevalent of current utilitarian
61
theories, that aim is overall social wealth or general welfare. This
aim is promoted, according to utilitarian commentators, when law
62
grants owners the freedom to act. As a result, although not invested
in freedom qua freedom, that is, in freedom’s inherent moral value,
utilitarian accounts of property still embrace property specifically due
to its freedom-promoting function.
Owners’ freedom to make independent decisions regarding the
use and transfer of assets is vital for general welfare because it assures
that assets are used in a socially efficient manner. The privateproperty regime promises an owner that she will reap the fruits of any

58. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 353.
59. Id. § 45 note; see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 58 (2012) (“Hegel’s theory shares with libertarian
accounts of property a fundamental concern with promoting individual freedom.”).
60. WALDRON, supra note 41, at 79.
61. E.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–12 (3d ed. 1986).
62. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 59, at 11–34 (providing an overview of
these commentators’ positions).
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positive developments of her land and bear the burdens of negative
developments; thereby the regime affords her a strong incentive to
63
choose for her land only uses whose benefits outweigh their costs.
Thus, as Professor Harold Demsetz argues in a seminal article, the
point of private property is that it aligns the owner’s incentives in the
utilization of her land with the social interests regarding its use.
Private property is the optimal solution for the societal challenge of
64
making efficient use of society’s limited resources.
A regime relying on the owner’s freedom is socially
advantageous not only because the owner holds the strongest
incentive to reach the most efficient decisions regarding the asset, but
also because no one else has better knowledge respecting an asset’s
65
best use. The owner, as the person closest to the asset, is the person
most familiar with it; additionally, and inevitably, she knows best
66
which uses will promote her own welfare as an individual.
Utilitarians, accordingly, argue that an asset’s true social value can
only be discerned through market transactions whereby independent
67
owners freely express their preferences respecting the asset. The free
market is capable of rectifying the situation when the current owner
does not place the highest subjective value on, or is not the best user
of, the asset. Such an owner will be furnished with pecuniary
incentives to identify and contract with another individual who places
68
a higher value on the asset. Thus, through a utilitarian analysis, the
owner’s freedom to independently adopt decisions governing the use
and transfer of land renders private property the optimal regime for
resource regulation.
3. The Key Role of an Owner’s Freedom in Relational Property
Theories. The legal academic accounts forming the third archetype of

63. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968)
(describing this regime).
64. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348
(1967).
65. Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754–55 (2004).
66. Most current utilitarian theories define social welfare as the maximum satisfaction of
individual subjective preferences. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare:
Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 982
(2001).
67. Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in
COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING: CRITICAL STUDIES ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF SOCIALISM
87, 97 (F. Hayek ed. 1935) (1920).
68. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–20 (2004).
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property theories combine elements from the right-based and
utilitarian theories to synthesize a description of the function of
property that differs from that drawn by those two groups of theories.
Nonetheless, like right-based and utilitarian theories, this last group
of theories celebrates ownership’s role as provider of freedom. The
theories considered in this Section under the collective heading
“relational” have gained in popularity over the past two decades.
69
Amongst them, I count theories titled civic-republican,
70
71
72
73
Aristotelian, objective-wellbeing, human-flourishing, pluralist,
74
75
76
social-relations, social-obligation, and progressive-property. Like
right-based theories, these theories all cherish specific values. Yet,
unlike right-based theories whose focus is on individual rights,
relational theories share with utilitarianism the belief that property is
justified because it promotes social goals. Unlike utilitarianism,
however, these theories have a preset view of what those social goals,
or values, are. They do not define social goals in terms of overall
77
welfare (that is, satisfying subjective preferences), but rather ground
them in a specific objective view of the common good and of
desirable social interactions.
More often than not, freedom is one of the defining elements of
these desirable interactions, and property is heralded as its
78
paramount purveyor. This attitude is associated with the most
influential relational-property theory in American thinking—civic
republicanism. Civic republicanism locates property’s justification in

69. William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1335–36
(1991).
70. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–65 (2009).
71. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1669 (2003).
72. Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2011).
73. Davidson, supra note 29, at 1600; Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of
Waste Law, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654–58 (2006).
74. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 741, 742 (1986).
75. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 745 (2009).
76. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009).
77. For utilitarians, welfare includes everything that an individual might value. LOUIS
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18 (2006).
78. E.g., Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1237, 1237 (2005).
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its democratic role. A tradition hearkening back to canonical thinkers
such as Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson, it posits that propertyholding is a prerequisite for meaningful citizen participation in
79
government. To be an active citizen, freely participating in the
80
political realm, the individual must not depend on others. As long as
others control her economic wellbeing, an individual cannot be
expected to be free from their will when politically participating.
Jefferson, therefore, extolled the independent yeoman living on his
own land. In Jefferson’s mind, and in that of his disciples, the
persistence of republican governance hinges on widespread propertyownership because ownership assures the freedom to independently
81
make decisions regarding one’s life, interests, land, and politics.
Similar support for wide ownership-distribution is proclaimed by
the other theories listed above as relational, although their focus is
82
not limited to ownership’s political function. These other relational
theories suggest that society entertains a substantive conception of
the good life. As a society, we believe that certain things are good for
83
people and that having such things makes for better lives.
Prominently, and in clear departure from the Jeffersonian fixation on
the detached yeoman, non-civic republican relational theories count
relationships with others among those things individuals must have in
84
order to flourish.
The ensuing reverence for property law’s power to foster
relationships—rather than isolation—renders relational theories
hospitable to limitations on the powers of owners. Nonetheless,
relational theorists contend that the relationships humans must
maintain if they are to flourish have to be based on a great degree of
freedom. The objective values necessary for a good life include deep
social relations, but also autonomy and liberty, which imply an ability
to choose one’s life course. Such choices are possible only through

79. On Aristotle’s political theory, see RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE 359–64 (2002); on
Jefferson’s view of property, see ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 26–42. For a modern theory of
property based on republicanism, see Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1325 (1987).
80. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XIX (1785).
81. DANIEL HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA
1815-1848, at 489 (2007).
82. E.g., SINGER, supra note 30, at 144; Alexander, supra note 75, at 768.
83. E.g., Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 71, at 1701–14; Peñalver, supra note 70, at 864.
84. E.g., Alexander, supra note 75, at 765–73.
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85

independent control of some material goods. Individuals cannot
pursue the lives they desire or freely enter relationships that enable
86
them to flourish if they lack unilateral control over some assets.
Property law must afford them such control. For law to promote
wellbeing and sustain vital relationships, it must assure an ample
measure of freedom and autonomy to a widespread population of
property holders.
B. Limitations on an Owner’s Freedom in Current Property Theories
As the preceding exposition concluded, all property theories
attribute to ownership the salutary function of furthering freedom.
Accordingly, property law’s doctrines have been structured toward
87
the promotion of the owner’s autonomy. Yet, in a world of limited
resources, in which owners are surrounded by other owners, there is
no possible way to secure for all owners the capacity to freely do as
they wish with their property. If one owner is free, for example, to
construct a reservoir that floods underground shafts connecting her
land with another’s, the second owner is not free to operate a mine on
88
her land. If red cedar trees communicate a disease to apple trees,
owners are not free to plant apple trees if their neighbor is free to
89
plant red cedars. If all local owners are free to enforce an
agreement—a “covenant”—barring themselves and their successors
from conveying their properties to “people of the Negro or
Mongolian race,” African Americans can never freely become
90
owners. Property rights conflict; one owner’s freedom of action
inevitably interferes with another’s. As a result it is clear that all three
property theories admit and even require limits on the owner’s
91
freedom; uncertainty solely surrounds the location of those limits.
Each theory places the limits in accordance with its own particular
normative standards for defining and designing property rights.

85. Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Concept of Well-Being, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 51, 65, 67 (1998).
86. SINGER, supra note 30, at 15.
87. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1728–31 (1976).
88. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 (H.L.) 339 (appeal taken from Eng.).
89. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (holding that the state was within its
power to choose the destruction of one class of property to save another).
90. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1948) (addressing a covenant restricting
property ownership based on race).
91. SINGER, supra note 30, at 16.
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Right-based property theories ground property in individual
rights, such as freedom. Yet they only recognize a right as long as its
92
exercise does not harm the rights of others. Thus, right-based
arguments must discern what counts as harm—or, more precisely,
illegitimate harm—and then limit the owner’s right when her freedom
of action engenders such harm. Utilitarian arguments embrace the
owner’s freedom because, thanks to the owner’s right to the asset, her
private interests align with social interests concerning its use. But
when those interests do not correspond—when the owner’s freedom
of action produces effects felt only by others—the owner’s freedom of
action does not promote social welfare. The task for utilitarians is to
identify such externalities that cannot be internalized by the owner
through bargaining with others and limit her freedom of action to
93
avert them. Relational explanations hold that individual freedom
assured through ownership is necessary for human flourishing. But
they realize that beyond a certain point, a commitment to an owner’s
individual freedom either defeats shared relationships that are also
necessary for flourishing or interferes with the ability of others to
94
acquire minimal resources for flourishing. Ascertaining the correct
mixture between these interests needed for flourishing, and limiting
an owner’s freedom in accordance, is the challenge for relational
theorists.
The diverse balancing acts required by the different theories—
right-based, utilitarian, and relational—are executed through
property law’s specific doctrines. Relying on right-based, utilitarian,
or relational theories, a court might employ nuisance law to conclude
that the owner’s freedom to construct the reservoir should be
95
curtailed to protect her neighboring owner’s freedom. Relying on
right-based, utilitarian, or relational theories, a legislature might avail
itself of the police power to conclude that owners’ freedom to grow
96
red cedars should be curtailed to protect other owners’ freedom.
92. E.g., The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen art. 4 (1789) (“Liberty
consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else.”), reprinted in HUMAN
RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 744, 744 (Albert P. Blaustein et al. eds., 1987); JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 93 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (“The individual is not accountable to society for
his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself.”).
93. Lee Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1503 (2013).
For a detailed discussion on the role of externalities in utilitarian property theories, see infra
Part III.B.
94. SINGER, supra note 30, at 12.
95. See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] L.R. 3 (H.L.) 339. (appeal taken from Eng.).
96. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1927) (quoting VA. CODE §§ 885–893 (1924)).
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Relying on right-based, utilitarian, or relational theories, a court or
legislature may reform the law of covenants to curtail owners’
freedom to enforce racially restrictive covenants, in order to protect
97
others’ freedom. As these examples illustrate, to serve all or any of
the goals theorists ascribe to property, law limits owners’ freedom in
many ways. The checks scholars usually recognize as placed on
98
owners’ freedom fall into one of the following categories: limits on
what the owner can do with her property, limits on the owner’s
freedom to exclude, limits on the owner’s ability to determine who
will own the property in the future, lack of immunity against having
the property taken by the government, and regulations of
relationships among the owner and the owners of other interests in
the property.
Most—perhaps all—of these checks on ownership heretofore
appreciated by legal academic writers are negative in nature. They
limit what the owner can do with her land, but they do not force her
99
to actually do something with it. As Anthony Honoré explains in his
famed exploration of the institution of ownership, the acknowledged
“social aspect” of ownership is not truly affirmative. “Positive control
by the state shades into prohibition. The positive duty to exploit one’s
property in a socially beneficial way, as opposed to the prohibition of
a harmful exploitation, has not been generally imposed or its
100
implications fully worked out.”
This accepted legal wisdom
engenders claims that ownership includes the right to let land lie
101
fallow or gather dust. In light of the disparate property theories this
Part reviewed, this state of affairs is wholly justified. Property is
promulgated to advance freedom, solely or among other values.
Although absolute freedom is unattainable in a society in which every
owner is located in proximity to other owners and is able to control
others’ access to ownership, the complete negation of owners’
freedom—the coercion of owners into action—appears inappropriate.
97. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that court enforcement of
restrictive covenants is an exercise of police power); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
98. Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 641–43 (1988).
99. An exception might be found in an article by Larissa Katz in which she describes
ownership as an “office” through which the state presses owners into its service, assigning them
burdens. See Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Property Rights
Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2035 (2012). Still, the only affirmative burden
discussed in Katz’s work is the owner’s statutory obligation in many cities to shovel snow from
the adjoining sidewalk.
100. Honoré, supra note 10, at 146.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
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C. Owners’ Affirmative Duties in Anglo-American Law: From Status
to Contract
In view of these current understandings of ownership, rules were
supposedly adopted in Anglo-American property law to free owners
102
from the specter of affirmative obligations. Professor James Harris’s
important work on the concept of property in law concludes that
“property-duty . . . rules . . . play an insignificant role in modern
103
. . . institutions.”
Property-duty rules “constitute an eccentric
104
anachronism in the modern world.” The reason, Harris explains, is
105
that such duties are characteristic of feudal property institutions.
Much of the attachment professed by modern thinkers of all three
property theories to the owner’s freedom, as depicted in this Part,
106
stems from their reaction to feudalism. The feudal social system
contradicts modern ideas of individual rights, efficient free markets,
and human flourishing. Feudalism was a system in which the King
allocated land to lords in exchange for services, such as loyalty and
raising armies and goods. In turn, lords allocated rights in the land to
those below them on the hierarchical ladder, again in exchange for
services, including labor on lands held by the lord, or coming to his
107
aid when called. In such a legal order, in which property relations
embodied personal relations taking place in a society defined by
inequality, obligation, and static positions, a duty placed on the
landholder to actively engage in specific behaviors on his land—to
employ it for certain purposes, to put it to productive use, to maintain
it—was completely coherent with the system’s principles. After all,
the whole estates system was founded on this idea of affirmative
108
obligations owed by a land’s holder.
But with the dawn of the liberal age, the feudal social order was
condemned and eventually overthrown. The feudal conception of
property fell out of fashion: law came to prohibit feudal landholding,

102. JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY 635–36 (3d ed. 2010). An example is the rule against
perpetuities, which frees certain interest holders from affirmative (as well as negative)
obligations attached to their interest by a predecessor. The rule against restraints on alienation
often performs a similar function.
103. J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 37 (2002).
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id.
106. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 292–93 (1998).
107. For more on the feudal system, see generally A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE
LAND LAW (2d ed. 1986).
108. Cribbet, supra note 34, at 39.
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Allodial
mandating instead that all land titles be “allodial.”
property was defined as “free; not holden of any lord or superior;
owned without obligation or vassalage or fealty; the opposite of
110
feudal.” As the great legal historian Henry Maine famously put it,
111
law progressed “from [s]tatus to [c]ontract.” Feudal property
holding was a status ineluctably and immutably carrying duties of
loyalty, obligation, and service toward others; modern, allodial,
property holding is supposed to entail no similar duties.
If duties to act are to be recognized and enforced against an
owner, the owner must freely elect and design them. In other words,
affirmative duties can be placed on ownership only through
contract—not through the mere status of ownership. For example,
Jane, Blackacre’s owner, can promise another person that she will
produce something on Blackacre or preserve its appearance. She can
enter a contract with the Department of Agriculture whereby she
112
promises to take actions to conserve the soil. If Jane leases, rather
than owns, Blackacre, her lease might require her to not let it lie
fallow and to “cultivate the premises . . . in a farmerlike manner and
according to the usual course of farming practiced in the
113
neighborhood.”
In contrast, as the eminent jurist William
Blackstone explained, if she “be the [holder of the] absolute . . . feesimple . . . [s]he may commit whatever waste [her] own indiscretion
may prompt [her] to, without being impeachable or accountable for it
114
to anyone.” As a result, “though the waste is undoubtedly damnum,
115
it is damnum abseque injuria [a moral wrong without legal redress].”
This “waste” will only become a wrong with legal redress if, as in
the examples of the contract with the Department of Agriculture or
the lease, Jane herself consented to refrain from committing it. The
obligation in these cases arises from Jane’s agreement, rather than
from her status as the land’s holder. It is personal to her. Jane the
109. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 28; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 14; Wallace v.
Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492, 501 (1863) (holding that all property in Pennsylvania is allodial “purged
of all the rubbish of the dark ages, excepting only the feudal names of things not any longer
feudal”).
110. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (6th ed. 1990).
111. HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 179 (3d ed., Transaction Publishers 2002) (1866)
(emphasis omitted).
112. 30 U.S.C. § 1236(a) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to enter such
agreements).
113. Coats v. Stephens, 67 Cal. App. 753, 754 (Ct. App. 1924).
114. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 223–24.
115. Id. at 224 (emphasis omitted).
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person, not Jane Blackacre’s owner, may, by her own choosing,
become obliged to produce something on Blackacre or to conserve its
116
appearance.
Duties to act on the land that are embedded in ownership,
independent of any contract, are supposedly alien to modern,
postfeudal property law. Even writers that lament this development
acknowledge it. “The disappearance of any long established social
system must involve some losses. And so, in the case of feudalism it is
regrettable that there could not have been preserved the idea that all
117
property was held subject to the performance of duties . . . .” Or
“nothing in American law resembles a sustained account of a . . .
norm predicated on the idea that private ownership entails
118
obligations to act.”
D. The Policy Effect of Current Property Theory’s Attitude Toward
Affirmative Duties: The Debate over Lenders’ Responsibilities
These prevalent accounts, observing that modern American
property law has repudiated all affirmative duties not created by the
owner herself, exert influence on the development of current laws.
The trope that in the modern legal system the owner can let her
property lie fallow or gather dust echoes, as just seen, historical
concerns and normative values associated with property. It therefore
easily impacts judicial attitudes toward property law. The trope’s
resulting impact has been to decrease the law’s ability to confront
119
new challenges.
A striking example is the legal backlash against the response of
120
states and local governments to the housing-market crash of 2008.

116. Thus, for example, the statute limits soil conservation agreements to ten years, and the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture must determine that the party will control the land
for the duration. 30 U.S.C. § 1236(a) (2012).
117. Francis Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 710
(1938).
118. Alexander, supra note 75, at 757.
119. I am grateful to Laura Underkuffler for encouraging me to think of the problem in
these terms.
120. In the late 2000s, a major recession hit the American and then the global markets.
According to the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession in the United
States began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
US BUSINESS CYCLES AND CONTRACTIONS (2012), available at http://www.nber.org/
cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_20120423.pdf. Most of the American
public associates the starting point of the recession with the fall of Lehman Brothers investment
bank in September 2008, especially because a major cause of the recession was the subprime
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In the aftermath of the market’s collapse, many urban and suburban
neighborhoods were dotted with neglected properties, whose owners
121
were, more often than not, long gone. As both policy-makers and
researchers believe that such properties are extremely detrimental to
122
their surroundings, cities and states throughout the nation have
been devising means to tackle the problem presented by properties
whose owners defaulted on their mortgages. A particularly appealing
strategy has been to target mortgagees—the banks who hold liens
over these neglected or vacant properties. New or revised state and
local laws render lending institutions liable for the upkeep of vacant
123
houses and lots after the owner defaults on the mortgage.
Laws and ordinances differ with respect to the specific
124
obligations they institute. The exact moment at which the lien
holder becomes responsible for these obligations also varies across
jurisdictions. For example, some impose liability on the lender
125
immediately upon the owner’s default on the loan. Others tie
126
liability to the initiation of the foreclosure proceedings, and still
others to the assumption of possession of the property by the lender
127
during those proceedings.
Elsewhere, the obligation applies

mortgage market. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Eight Days, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 59
(describing the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy as the beginning of the recession).
121. See, e.g., DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK TEAM, EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD HAS A
FUTURE . . . AND IT DOESN’T INCLUDE BLIGHT (May 2014) (report of the task force appointed
by the President regarding the extent and effect of neglected houses in Detroit).
122. Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-4.5 (West 2009) (“Vacant, deteriorated structures
contribute to blight, cause a decrease in property values, and discourage neighbors from making
improvements to properties. . . . Structures that remain boarded up for an extended period of
time also exert a blighting influence and contribute to the decline of the neighborhood by
decreasing property values, discouraging persons from moving into the neighborhood, and
encouraging persons to move out of the neighborhood.”). See infra notes 353–60 and
accompanying text.
123. The consumer credit industry’s national trade association reports that as of April 17,
2014, 684 cities had enacted such ordinances. Such cities can be found in all but a handful of
states (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawai’i, Montana, North Dakota). AM. FIN. SERV. ASS’N,
VACANT, ABANDONED, AND FORECLOSED PROPERTY: MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES (2014).
124. For examples of such local maintenance code obligations, see infra notes 272–79 and
accompanying text.
125. E.g., CHULA VISTA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 15.60.040 (2014); CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 1312-126 (holding a mortgagee liable within the later of thirty days after the building becomes
vacant or sixty days after a default).
126. E.g., BOS., MA., ORDINANCE § 16-52.3 (applying an obligation seven days after
“initiation of the foreclosure”); MADISON, WIS. GEN. ORDINANCE § 27.10 (applying obligations
thirty days following the initiation of foreclosure proceedings).
127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-15-401 (2014).
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Another
following the issuance of a foreclosure judgment.
jurisdiction introduces it upon conclusion of the bidding process at
129
the foreclosure sale. Finally, the duty may come into effect later
130
still, once the foreclosure sale is completed. Though they thereby
differ in their details, these laws all subject lenders to upkeep
requirements. Minnesota adopted a measure that is even more
innovative. The pertinent state statute empowers local governments
to expedite the foreclosure process by demanding that the court
shorten the mortgagor’s redemption period and thereby force lenders
or buyers at a foreclosure sale to assume ownership of abandoned
131
residential properties.
These efforts to expand lenders’ liability for the upkeep of
132
properties met with stern resistance from lenders, and courts were
133
often persuaded by these lenders’ arguments. Successful legal

128. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney Supp. 2014) (applying
maintenance obligations to lenders after judgments of foreclosure).
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.031 (West 2010) Minnesota applies the obligation to the
holder of a sheriff’s certificate—issued to the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, normally,
the lending bank—but only if she knows that there is prima facie evidence of abandonment of
the property. Id. Note that under foreclosure laws, the holder of the sheriff’s certificate is not
the owner of the land. Id. The borrower remains the owner as she still holds the right of
redemption. Id.
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.3 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014) (creating a duty to maintain
“vacant residential property purchased by that owner at a foreclosure sale, or acquired by that
owner through foreclosure under a mortgage or deed of trust”).
131. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 582.032 (West 2010 & Supp. 2014). Other states have also allowed
for the shortening of the foreclosure proceeding in the case of vacant properties, but their
statutes do not include a provision enabling the local government to force this option on the
mortgagee. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3240(9)-(10), 600.3241, 600.3241a (West 2010
& Supp. 2014); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1505.8 (West Supp. 2014) (following a pilot
program adopted by the Cook County Court); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.11
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (responding to the report of the MD. FORECLOSURE TASK FORCE
REPORT (Jan. 11, 2012), which recommended following the example set by the Cook County
Court in Illinois).
132. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, VACANT PROPERTY REGISTRATION, http://www.
mortgagebankers.org/VacantPropertyRegistration.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2014); Robert Klein,
An Outbreak of Ordinances, MORTGAGE BANKING, Aug. 1, 2008, at 46.
133. Courts have been even more resistant to lawsuits by local governments challenging
directly the lending practices of banks (rather than banks’ alleged disregard of mortgaged
properties’ level of upkeep), and claiming that they were responsible for the market’s collapse
and the ensuing deterioration of urban neighborhoods. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009), aff’d, 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir.
2010); City of Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-Ohio-1035, 2013 WL
1183332 (8th Dist. Ohio Mar. 21, 2013). Localities’ efforts to argue that these lending practices
represented discrimination prohibited by the Federal Housing Act have similarly failed. See
Dekalb Cnty. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-03640-SCJ, 2013 WL 7874104 (N.D.
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challenges to new lender obligations were based on varied claims.
Upkeep ordinances were deemed a regulation of the credit market
and therefore preempted by state laws governing the lending
134
industry’s business practices or by the federal laws under which
135
certain industry participants operate. Ordinances were also found to
represent a form of taxation and were thus potentially subject to state
136
constitutional restrictions on taxes. A city’s attempt to ground an
ordinance in the obligation the city owes other residents was denied
when the court refused to acknowledge any such municipal
137
obligation. Finally, some courts simply determined that mortgagees
138
could not be held liable to the city for the condition of properties.
All these varied doctrinal grounds for denying the imposition of
an obligation on lenders rely on one key assumption: the courts
conceive maintenance obligations as impinging on the banks’
traditional freedom as holders of either the property
139
(postforeclosure) or a lien over it (preforeclosure).
These
obligations are viewed as new regulations imposed on private interest
holders. They are treated as regulations that interfere with property
rights and extend beyond the allowable contours of land-use
140
controls. As a new form of regulating property rights, these
141
obligations are, according to the lending industry and the federal

Ga. Sept. 25, 2013); City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL
1706756 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011).
134. City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 897 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (S.D.
Ohio 2012).
135. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chi., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (refusing
to apply Chicago’s maintenance ordinance against Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
136. Easthampton Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2013).
137. City of Cincinnati, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 644 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
138. Hausman v. Dayton, 653 N.E. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 1995) (dismissing the city’s codeenforcement claims against mortgagee, and explaining that the mortgagee can only become
liable when the mortgagor’s interest terminates).
139. E.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (concluding that maintenance
duties are not traditional regulation of property, but rather, are a form of financial regulation);
City of Cincinnati, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (denying the city’s claim that the banks’ practices
unreasonably interfere with a common public right given that “[m]ost of the ‘practices’ the City
targets are not inherently dangerous nor are they unlawful, such as foreclosing on mortgage
loans, taking title to dilapidated or abandoned buildings, or selling properties at firesale
prices”).
140. Keith H. Hirokawa & Ira Gonzalez, Regulating Vacant Property, 42 URB. LAW. 627,
633–37 (2010) (criticizing vacant-property ordinances as regulations of property rights).
141. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, VACANT PROPERTY REGISTRATION, http://www.
mortgagebankers.org/VacantPropertyRegistration.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
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housing finance agency’s legal position, “onerous,” “vague,” and
142
“subjective.”
In other words, upkeep duties are perceived in the current legal
struggle over lenders’ responsibilities as external to property holding:
they are administrative regulations of private property, or taxes levied
on private property. Given that there are many legal limits on the
government’s ability to interfere with property—to regulate or tax
private property—this perception facilitates the striking down of new
ordinances imposing duties on lenders. The persistent perception of
maintenance duties and other affirmative duties as external to
property is an outgrowth of the attachment of American law to the
trope of the owner’s right to let her land lie fallow or gather dust.
Elsewhere, civil-law scholars have arguably been able to sometimes
143
disassociate themselves from this trope. Still its grip on AngloAmerican legal thinking has been unwavering, mainly due to the
philosophical and historical reasons described in this Part. The

142. Verified Complaint, at 2, 5, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. City of Chi., No. 11CV08795
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2011). The district court later accepted the position of the federal agency and
ruled against Chicago. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1044 at 1061. In the spring of
2014, the parties settled and Chicago waived its right to appeal. The federal agency agreed to
voluntarily register all vacant properties in which it held an interest, but not to pay any fees as
required by the local ordinance governing such interests. Mary Ellen Podmolik, Chicago,
Federal Housing Finance Agency, End Vacant Property Dispute, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2014,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-08/business/ct-chicago-vacant-buildings-0408-biz20140408_1_vacant-building-ordinance-vacant-properties-fannie-mae.
143. The French jurist Léon Duguit famously argued in the early twentieth century that
“property is not a right; it is a social function.” According to Duguit, an owner is obliged to put
her property to productive use, and the state is entitled to sanction her if she does not do so.
LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE
NAPOLÉON 21 (2d ed. 1920). Duguit was not describing the contemporary state of French law or
the thinking of legal scholars, but rather, was criticizing legal scholars for not recognizing
property’s social function. The extent of Duguit’s ideas’ impact on the laws of European
countries is debatable. The German Basic Law, for example, announces: “Property entails
obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ][GG][BASIC LAW] art. 14, § 2 (Ger.). The
Civil Code of the Netherlands contains a title “Rights and Obligations of Owners.” BW Book 5,
Title 4 (Neth.). However, most of the obligations it lists are negative. The sole affirmative
obligations are the duty to keep shrubs and trees within a distance from the boundary of
adjacent land (art. 42), and the duty to maintain visible marks of the boundary (art. 46), or, in a
built-up area, to erect a dividing wall (art. 49). Duguit’s thinking has perhaps played a greater
role in South American legal systems. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.]
art. 58. For more on Duguit and his influence, see, for example, Nestor M. Davidson, Sketches
for a Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social Function of Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 1070
(2011); M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22
FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 226 (2010).
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resultant hostile approach toward lenders’ responsibilities is
unfortunate, for as will now be clarified, this trope is simply wrong.
II. CURRENT PROPERTY LAW: A DUTY TO MAINTAIN
EMBEDDED IN OWNERSHIP
This Part detects a duty to maintain internal to property law—a
concept that flies in the face of conventional wisdom, and contradicts
the normative justifications for the modern institution of property
reviewed in the preceding Part. Later, Part III shows that this last
contradiction is illusory as the normative justifications for property in
fact demand the duty to maintain. But first, it is necessary to
understand the positive manner in which the duty, until now ignored,
operates. Current law imposes the duty to maintain on the owner
through multiple doctrines. The effect of these varied doctrines can
best be grasped when they are categorized in accordance with the
sanction they employ: potential monetary liability or potential loss of
land. This Part is divided accordingly: it first uncovers doctrines that
establish the duty through monetary sanctions, and second, it reveals
doctrines that do so via forfeiture. The duty that crystallizes from
these different rules will then be summarized and tied to other
elements recognized as inherent to ownership.
A. Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain Through Financial Liability
One way for property law to establish a duty to maintain is to
render an owner who neglects her land vulnerable to financial
liability—in the form of damages or an injunction mandating repairs.
Property law contains a wealth of rules exposing owners to such
liability. Counting mostly common-law doctrines, but concluding with
statutory expansions, they include waste law, negligence law as
applied to harms to outsiders generated by the land’s conditions,
negligence law as applied to harms to outsiders generated by
unauthorized entrants to the land, negligence law as applied to harms
to trespassers, private nuisance law, public nuisance law, supportrights law, affirmative-covenants law, easements law, landlord–tenant
law, building codes, and farming law.
1. Waste Law. Waste is a property-law doctrine that explicitly
targets those who fail to maintain their land, and therefore, it is a
natural starting point for this Part’s exploration of doctrines imposing
a duty to maintain. At the same time, waste applies only to confined
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settings. The doctrine solely regulates the uses of lands in which
several parties hold interests not equal in status and effect. It
empowers the person to whom possession of the land will inevitably
shift at the conclusion of a lease or a specific person’s lifetime to bring
144
suit to halt the present possessor from committing waste therein. In
current American law, it similarly limits the freedom of those holding
145
land subject to a mortgage, to protect the mortgagee’s security.
Waste law thus applies to tenants, life tenants, and mortgagors.
The waste these interest-holders are prohibited from committing
encompasses two kinds of behavior. One is “affirmative waste”:
injurious acts the holder perpetrates on the land, such as razing a
146
building. Another form is “permissive waste”: harms done to the
147
property through the holder’s failure to act. This form of forbidden
waste imposes on the present holder an affirmative duty to maintain
148
the property in good repair. Thus, a holder of a lease, life estate, or
mortgaged land is liable for waste if she, for example, fails to pay
149
150
property taxes, allows a house to deteriorate, permits farmland to
151
152
lie untilled, stands idle as weeds infest the land, stops watering a
153
154
lawn, or ceases to prune and fumigate an orchard.
As these examples illustrate, waste law creates a conspicuous
duty to maintain, which applies to holders of certain present estates.
Unlike waste, the various doctrines to next be inspected in this Part
are not quite as patent in their concern with a duty to maintain land,
and thus have never been recognized as serving such a duty. But in
actuality, these doctrines set a duty to maintain. Furthermore,
because the rules presented in the subsequent Sections cover a
markedly more diverse—sometimes all encompassing—group of
holders of interests in land, they are much more consequential than
waste law.
144. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 801 (McKinney 2009); Pasulka v. Koob, 524
N.E.2d 1227, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 4.6 (1997).
146. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, & MICHAEL SCHILL,
PROPERTY 218 (7th ed. 2010).
147. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 5.2(8), at 737 (2d ed. 1993).
148. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Life Tenants and Remaindermen § 30.
149. McIntyre v. Scarbrough, 471 S.E.2d 199, 201 (Ga. 1996).
150. Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
151. Jeffreys v. Hocutt, 142 S.E.2d 226, 228 (N.C. 1928).
152. Lytle v. Payette-Oregon Slope Irrigation Dist., 154 P.2d 934, 939 (Or. 1944).
153. Kimbrough v. Reed, 943 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Idaho 1997).
154. Anderson v. Hammon, 24 P. 228, 229 (Or. 1890).
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2. Negligence Law. All owners—not just those subject to waste
law (tenants, life tenants, and mortgagors)—are subject to a duty to
maintain premised on negligence law. Negligence law presents a
neglectful landowner with the specter of liability for injuries off the
land caused by the condition of her land, for injuries to outsiders
inflicted by unauthorized entrants to the landowner’s land, and for
injuries to trespassers.
a. Liability for Conditions Causing Injuries Off the Land.
Owners of land are constantly under threat of liability for physical
harms that their land’s condition may inflict on outsiders. Liability in
negligence for such damages often results from acts the owner
committed—such as improper construction of an awning, the
subsequent accumulation of water on the sidewalk due to this
improper construction, and the injury to a passerby who slipped on
155
the frozen water. But liability can also be imposed when the owner
did not act. Liability can be imposed in cases in which the owner’s
neglect of her land caused injuries to others. Such negligence liability
arising from neglect creates a duty for owners to maintain their land.
A cursory review of cases illustrates this point.
In several cases, owners were found liable when vegetation on
156
their land blocked sightlines of motorists on adjacent roads, or
157
interfered with sidewalks. Owners were charged with damages when
158
trees collapsed on neighbors’ properties, and when tree trunks or
159
roots damaged adjoining properties. In other cases, the owners lost
in court when a tree’s swinging dead limbs prevented the use of a
160
neighbor’s driveway, and when structures damaged by fire later
161
collapsed on adjacent lands. Lawsuits against owners were also
162
successful when pieces of structure fell on roads, and when weeds
163
facilitated fire. An owner was even found liable for the explosion of
a faulty gas-line located on her land although she was legally

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
1941).

McKinley v. Fanning, 595 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Idaho 1979).
Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 222 (Fla. 2001).
Rosengren v. Seattle, 205 P.3d 909, 914 (Wash. 2009).
Gibson v. Denton, 38 N.Y.S. 554, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896).
Scheckel v. NLI, Inc., 953 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Pesaturo v. Kinne, 20 A.3d 284, 291 (N.H. 2011).
Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 109 A. 653, 658 (Pa. 1920).
Brown v. Consol. Rail Corp., 717 A.2d 309, 317 (D.C. 1998).
Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Mining Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 116 P.2d 611, 620 (Cal.
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proscribed from attending to that gas-line. The court ruled in that
case that the owner was under a duty to demand that the city, which
had installed the gas-line and held exclusive rights to handle it, fix any
164
leak therein. In perhaps the most extreme of the cases imposing
liability, one owner was found negligent when she took no measures
165
to protect a downhill neighbor from natural landsides.
The general rule applied in all such cases is that an owner must
exercise reasonable care to prevent conditions on her property that
foreseeably lead to an unreasonable risk of harm to others beyond its
166
borders. This duty burdens all owners with the responsibility to
167
inspect their property and to secure any object located therein.
Originally, the duty only covered artificial conditions the owner
168
created (such as structures), but, as the cases indicate, the duty has
169
expanded to “natural” conditions as well. The recently adopted
Restatement (Third) of Torts reflects this trend and imposes liability
for natural conditions, as long as the owner “knows of the risk or if
170
the risk is obvious.” A few jurisdictions go further by jettisoning
171
knowledge requirements, imposing strict liability when a diseased
172
tree falls, or suggesting that dilapidated conditions alone suffice for
an inference that the owner’s property ignited fire in adjoining
173
properties. Even without such easing of the prerequisites for
liability, negligence law as currently applied to harms endured outside
the land places on an owner of land a duty to maintain her land up to
a reasonable standard.
b. Liability for Acts of Unauthorized Third Parties.
A
defendant’s liability in negligence for risks generated by her land’s
164. Black v. City of Cordele, 293 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
165. Sprecher v. Adamson, 636 P.2d 1121, 1130 (Cal. 1981).
166. Custom Craft Tile, Inc. v. Engineered Lubricants Co., 664 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Rosengren v. City of Seattle, 205 P.3d 909, 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
167. E.g., Marshall v. Erie Ins. Exch., 923 N.E.2d 18, 23, 24 (Ind. App. 2010).
168. See FRANCIS BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TORTS 47 (1926).
169. The precursor of the trend was Gibson v. Denton, 38 N.Y.S. 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896).
For an early, and positive, report on this trend, see PROSSER, TORTS § 76 (1941).
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 54(b)(2) (2012). When the property is commercial knowledge is not required. Id. § 54(b)(1).
171. Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 222 (Fla. 2001).
172. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 445 (La. 1975).
173. See Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 113–14 (Pa. 1977) (holding that the failure to
adequately maintain property where a fire had previously occurred could represent a breach of
the general duty to take care that one’s use of property does not harm the person or property of
another).
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condition stands out in tort law. Its basis is not the defendant’s actual
control of specific hazardous activities harming the plaintiff, as is
normally the case in tort law, but rather, the defendant’s inherent
174
control of the land she owns. Through the same rationale, an
owner’s liability in negligence extends to the harms inflicted by
others, whom she does not control, when they acted on her land,
which she does control. For example, an owner was liable when
trespassers used her land as dumping grounds and the debris they
175
jettisoned spread fire to neighboring properties; when a fire erupted
176
after trespassers smoked on her property; when her house fell into
177
visible disrepair attracting fire-setting vandals; when trespassing
motorcyclists used her land as a track, causing water damages to
178
neighbors; and when an unknown trespasser raped a neighbor’s
179
child in the owner’s vacant apartment.
In such cases, the owner is deemed responsible for the conduct of
entrants whose acts she does not control because as the owner, she
180
could have controlled their entry. When the owner neglected her
land she created conditions enabling trespassers to enter, and when
she later failed to police the trespassers’ behavior, she facilitated their
dangerous acts. Negligence law holds her liable for consequent harms
174. Another example of tortious liability detached from control over dangerous conditions
is defective products liability. The seller or distributer of a defective product is liable for harms
caused by the product after the sale or distribution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 1 (1998).
175. See Dealers Serv. & Supply Co. v. St. Louis Nat’l Stockyards, 508 N.E.2d 1241, 1244–45
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a duty to maintain that property so as to reduce the
foreseeable risk of fire was created because the landowner had knowledge of the dumping of
flammable materials on her property).
176. See Hesse v. Century Home Components, Inc., 514 P.2d 871, 873–74 (Or. 1973) (finding
that even if a third party had actually started the fire, the landowner was still on notice
regarding the risk of a fire, and had a duty to take reasonable care to alleviate that risk).
177. See Ford, 379 A.2d at 114–15 (finding that even if trespassers actually caused the fire,
liability could still be appropriately assessed to the defendant-landowner because the
trespassers’ actions would have remained within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by the
dilapidated state of the defendant’s property).
178. See Schropp v. Solzman, 314 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Iowa 1982) (holding that because the
landowner was aware of the damage caused to her property by the motorcyclists, she had a duty
to take reasonable steps to reduce the risk the damage could pose to others).
179. See Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt., 690 S.W.2d 546, 550–51 (Tex. 1985) (holding that a court
could find the incident in question foreseeable, given the condition of the landowner’s property,
and therefore, the landowner had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent damage to the
property of others).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 364(c) (1965) (“A possessor of land is
subject to liability to others outside of the land . . . which the possessor realizes or should realize
will involve a reasonable risk of such harm.”).
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to outsiders, and thus, it generates a duty to maintain land so as to
render it inhospitable to risky entrants and hazardous activities.
c. Liability for Injuries to Trespassers. Negligence law also
presses owners to maintain their land through the threat of liability
for harms incurred by individuals on the land. The common law holds
an owner responsible for injuries sustained by others while on her
land. Had such liability extended only to injuries suffered by
individuals to whose entry the owner consented, it would not have
amounted to a duty to maintain: an owner desiring to let her land
grow wild could have simply refrained from inviting entrants. But
liability cannot so readily be preempted. Law empowers a broader
group—not solely invited entrants—to seek remedy when injured on
another’s land. Because owners can be liable for injuries suffered by
unpermitted entrants—trespassers—the duty toward entrants
enforces on all owners a duty to maintain.
In the common law, owners owe an entrant a sliding scale of
181
duties of care linked to the legal status of the specific entrant.
Trespassers occupy the bottom rung of this hierarchy. Accordingly, a
landowner owes the trespasser “the lowest standard of care . . . . The
landowner is bound only to refrain from reckless, willful, or wanton
182
conduct toward the trespasser.” Standing alone, this rule places on
the owner no duty to maintain the land. It only imposes a duty to
avoid certain acts on the land. However, most jurisdictions assign a
higher status to some trespassers—known trespassers—and the
correlating higher duty of care they merit does entail a duty to
maintain. This category of trespassers consists not solely of
trespassers whose presence the owner discovered prior to their
183
injury. It also counts trespassers whom the owner did not discover,
but of whose presence she should have been aware: foreseeable
184
trespassers. An owner is deemed to have such constructive notice of
181. Traditionally, the three major statuses recognized were invitee, licensee, and trespasser.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329–32 (1965). The system was criticized and
abandoned in many states. E.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51–52 (Mass. 1973); Webb v.
City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 732–33 (Alaska 1977). The recently adopted
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 (2012)
rejects status-based duty rules and replaces them with a unitary duty.
182. Ryals v. U.S. Steel Corp., 562 So. 2d 192, 193–94 (Ala. 1990).
183. E.g., Moore v. Kurn, 108 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1939) (holding that the railroad may
be liable to a trespasser hit by a train when said train’s engineer had observed the trespasser).
184. E.g., Frederick v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 10 A.2d 576, 578 (Pa. 1940) (holding that
being on notice as to the presence of a trespasser is sufficient for a landowner to owe the
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a trespasser when, for example, her land is habitually and manifestly
185
trespassed, or if it houses a dangerous condition naturally attractive
186
to children (the “attractive nuisance” doctrine), such as a timber
187
188
stack or pool.
When the trespasser is known or foreseeable, the “standard of
duty is the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of
189
harm.” This duty is not a light one; indeed, it is similar to the duty
owed to invitees. In fact, the Restatement abolishes the distinction
between the duty owed to most trespassers and that owed to
190
permitted entrants. Courts thus found owners liable in cases
involving injuries to trespassers resulting from uninsulated electric
191
192
193
194
wires, furrows, waste-induced fires, a collapsing dump, an
195
196
197
unmarked barbed wire fence, a pond, and a river-crossing.
Naturally, the duty to protect trespassers has its limits. Some
courts note that liability is restricted to conditions presenting risk of
198
serious bodily injury. Liability is also sometimes confined to injuries
trespasser a duty of care); Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 499 (Ill. 1992) (adopting
the rule that if a landowner should reasonably know that a trespasser would be exposed to
danger on her land, then a duty of care toward that trespasser would arise).
185. See Imre v. Riegel Paper Co., 132 A.2d 505, 509–10 (N.J. 1957) (holding that indications
that trespassers frequently entered a potentially dangerous area should have been sufficient to
put the landowner on notice of a duty of care owed to those trespassers).
186. The doctrine is traced to Sioux City v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 657 (1873).
187. See generally Bransom v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638 (1884) (finding that a landowner owed a
duty to a trespassing child who could not have known of the danger posed by a negligently
stacked pile of timber).
188. See generally King v. Lennen, 348 P.2d 98, 100–01 (Cal. 1959) (holding that due to the
plaintiff’s young age, the danger of drowning posed by a swimming pool would not have been
apparent, and the doctrine of attractive nuisance should therefore apply). But see Mozier v.
Parsons, 887 P.2d 692, 698 (Kan. 1995) (stating generally that pools are not attractive
nuisances).
189. See Imre, 132 A.2d at 508.
190. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51
(2012). The only entrants to whom this duty does not apply are “flagrant trespassers.” Id. § 52.
Although they are not defined, the section notes that a significant factor must be their intent to
commit an illegal act. Id.
191. Wytupeck v. Camden, 136 A.2d 887, 896 (N.J. 1957).
192. Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A.2d 388, 390 (N.J. 1953).
193. Strang v. S. Jersey Broad. Co., 86 A.2d 777, 780 (N.J. 1952).
194. Imre, 132 A.2d at 511.
195. Webster v. Culbertson, 761 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Ariz. 1988).
196. Pocholec v. Giustina, 355 P.2d 1104, 1113 (Or. 1960).
197. City of Hous. v. Cavazos, 811 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tex. App. 1991).
198. E.g., Armenta v. City of Casa Grande, 71 P.3d 359, 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. g
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sustained due to conditions the entrant should not have noticed
199
200
herself, or to those arising from artificial conditions. Furthermore,
whereas in extreme cases the duty toward trespassers imposes a duty
201
to reconfigure the land, often the owner can dispense with her duty
202
by giving trespassers adequate warning of dangerous conditions.
Still, through negligence liability toward trespassers, the law imposes
on an owner a duty to maintain her land so as to limit the
development of, or the risk posed to others by, dangerous conditions
203
on the land.
3. Nuisance Law. Negligence law renders an owner liable when
others or their properties are injured due to the unreasonable
condition of the owner’s land. It thus incentivizes an owner to
maintain her land to prevent accidents. This incentive to maintain is
reinforced through nuisance law, which exposes an owner who fails to
maintain her land to financial liability even when its neglected state
does not precipitate an accident. A nuisance claim does not require
the plaintiff to sustain an injury, as it protects individuals not from
interferences with their bodily integrity or the wholeness of their
property, but rather from interferences with their use or enjoyment of
204
the property. Such interferences need not result in physical injury,
and they may affect one private owner’s ability to use or enjoy her
land or the whole public’s ability to do so.
a. Private Nuisance Law. In the typical nuisance case, an activity
one owner engages in on her land detrimentally affects another
owner’s enjoyment of her land without physically harming it. For
example, there may be liability for nuisance when one owner’s

(2012) (“A land possessor owes a duty of reasonable care to entrants on the land with regard to
all risks that exist on the land.”).
199. E.g., State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 290 (Tex. 2006). But see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. k (2012) (“[T]he fact
that a dangerous condition is open and obvious bears on the assessment of whether reasonable
care was employed, but it does not pretermit the land possessor’s liability.”).
200. E.g., Loney v. McPhillips, 521 P.2d 340, 345 (Or. 1974). But see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51, cmt. f (2012) (“The duty
of reasonable care imposed on a land possessor includes risks arising from natural conditions.”).
201. Sirek v. State, 496 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Minn. 1993).
202. Green-Glo Turf Farms v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1984).
203. “Generally, a landowner owes a duty of care to maintain his or her property in a
reasonably safe condition.” Gronski v. Cnty. of Monroe, 963 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (N.Y. 2011).
204. San Diego Gas & Elec. v. Superior Ct., 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996).
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business, operated on her land, exposes another owner’s land to loud
205
noises or foul odors.
Similar detrimental effects sometimes result not from the
owner’s activities on her land, but from her failure to act and regulate
her land’s conditions. An individual’s ability to enjoy her property is
decreased when a dilapidated property is located in the vicinity, and
hence that dilapidated property can qualify as a nuisance. For
example, courts found neglectful owners whose lands became hubs
for illegal activity, such as drug dealing, liable for nuisance due to
their neighbors’ lost sense of safety and the resultant decrease in the
value of their properties. Such suits were upheld despite the fact that
the owner-defendants neither participated in, nor authorized, the
206
illegal activity taking place on their property. As one court
explained, “[a] property owner cannot knowingly allow his property
to become a haven for criminals to the detriment of his neighbors and
deny that his property has become a nuisance because the resulting
207
criminal activities are those of third parties.” Owners, another court
declared, must “take all reasonable measures available to them to
208
control their property.”
To further broaden owners’ nuisance liability for failing to
maintain their properties, some states have turned to legislative
reform. California’s Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
209
Act renders a space used by gang members a private nuisance for
210
which its owner may be found liable. Even more prominently, some
state statutes now explicitly define as nuisances all decrepit and
untended properties that adversely affect the value of surrounding
properties or represent a hazard to the wellbeing of their dwellers. In

205. E.g., Kriener v. Turkey, 212 N.W.2d 526, 539 (Iowa 1973) (odor as nuisance); Stevens v.
Rockport Granite, 104 N.E. 371, 376 (Mass. 1914) (noise as nuisance).
206. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 47 (Ct. App. 1993); Kelly v. Boys’ Club of
St. Louis, 588 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). But see City of Seattle v. McCoy, 4 P.3d 159,
169 (Wash. App. 2000) (an owner may be liable only when she had notice, or should have had
notice, of illegal activity); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (West 2013) (establishing administrative
boards to resolve nuisance complaints brought by neighbors against owners in whose property
illegal activity was taking place); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.042 (West 2011)
(empowering neighbors to demand a meeting to present evidence of illegal activity to the
district attorney who can pursue a nuisance claim on their behalf).
207. Kelly, 588 S.W.2d at 257.
208. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 47.
209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22a (West 2014).
210. Id. Claimants are always eligible for an injunction. Damages can also be awarded if the
owner knew, or should have known, of the illegal activities.
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accordance, nearby owners are empowered to bring private nuisance
211
These recent expansive interpretations of the term
suits.
“nuisance,” in conjunction with the rulings extending liability for
illegal activities by third parties, transform private nuisance law into a
tool that imposes on owners a duty to maintain.
b. Public Nuisance Law. An owner’s neglect of her land does not
solely interfere with one neighbor’s, or a handful of neighbors’,
enjoyment of their properties. Rather, it often impacts a broader
community—sometimes an entire neighborhood. Property law has a
separate category of rules to regulate such interferences with the
wellbeing of whole swaths of the public—the aptly titled public
212
nuisance law. With case law burgeoning since the 1990s, public
nuisance law is now an even more profuse source of a duty to
maintain than private nuisance law.
In general, “[a] public nuisance is an unreasonable interference
213
with a right common to the general public.” This broad definition
can easily be used to impose obligations on owners to act on their
land, because, as one court explained, an unreasonable interference
might be inaction that “works some substantial annoyance,
214
inconvenience, or injury to the public.” The requirement is not that
some individual be actually annoyed or injured by the owner’s failure
215
to act; it suffices that such failure tends to inconvenience the public.
Thus, under public nuisance law, owners were found liable for not
treating still water on their land that may have contributed to the
216
217
spread of malaria; for retaining abandoned bridge piers; for
218
permitting corn to obstruct a public road; for not removing a dead

211. MO. ANN. STAT. § 82.1025 (West 1998 & Supp. 2014) (granting right of suit to “[a]ny
property owner who owns property within a reasonable distance”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3767.41 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014) (granting right of suit and expanding the range of remedies
available to “neighbors” owning property within five-hundred feet of a dilapidated building).
212. SINGER, supra note 30, at 123.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). Some definitions are more precise.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2012) (“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons . . . .”).
214. Commonwealth v. S. Covington & C. St. Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 459, 583 (1918).
215. Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 214 Ill. 628, 636 (1905).
216. See Mills v. Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (holding that the dam
erected by defendant and rendering the surrounding area unhealthy was a public nuisance).
217. United States v. Ill. Terminal R.R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
218. Guy v. State, 438 A.2d 1250, 1255 (Del. Super. 1981).
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tree; for allowing runoff water to freeze on an adjacent sidewalk;
221
and for not securing abandoned buildings. As these examples
illustrate, public nuisance law creates an obligation toward the
222
community to reasonably maintain one’s property.
4. Servitudes Law. When established through negligence or
nuisance, the maintenance standard the duty to maintain imposes is
grounded in reasonableness. A harsher maintenance requirement
extending beyond a reasonableness standard is instituted through
servitudes law—including support rights, affirmative covenants, and
easements.
a. Support Rights. All landowners have an absolute right to
lateral support: “to have the soil in its natural condition supported by
223
the soil of adjoining land in its natural conditions.” In light of this
224
“original right incident to [every man’s] property,” which “stands on
225
natural justice, and is not dependent upon grant,” law imposes on
all owners a duty not to interfere with the lateral support their land
226
provides to neighboring lands. The neighbor’s right for such support
of her land is a servitude—it is a nonpossessory interest burdening
227
another owner’s land. A breach of this right of the neighbor exposes
228
the owner to liability, even if she behaved reasonably.
The duty to respect the neighbor’s right to support is first and
229
foremost a negative obligation. The typical interference with lateral
support occurs when excavation works disturb a neighboring land’s

219. Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry., 227 N.W. 385, 386 (Wis. 1929).
220. Leahan v. Cochran, 60 N.E. 382, 382 (Mass. 1901).
221. Sanford v. Detroit, 371 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
222. Historically, public nuisance claims were pursued by public officials, rather than private
individuals. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984). But today, all
individuals can seek injunctions against public nuisances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821C(2)(c) (1979). To seek damages, they must endure “special injury”—a harm distinct from
that the public suffered. E.g., Phila. Elec. v. Hercules, 762 F.2d 303, 315–16. (3d Cir. 1985).
223. 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 69.01.
224. Hunt v. Peake, [1860] 70 Eng. Rep. 605.
225. Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1, 3 (1885).
226. E.g., Prete v. Cray, 141 A. 609, 611 (R.I. 1928).
227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1) (2000).
228. E.g., Tunstall, 80 Va. at 3.
229. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877) (“[E]ach owner has the absolute right to
have his land remain in its natural condition, unaffected by any act of his neighbor . . . .”).
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support. The duty is, however, transformed into an affirmative
obligation—a duty to maintain—in cases involving retaining walls.
When a wall on one owner’s land supports the soil of another’s,
courts hold that the owner has “the obligation to maintain the wall to
231
support the [neighbor’s] land.” The owner is liable if, even while
behaving reasonably, she fails to maintain the retaining wall whose
conditions deteriorate, thereby causing the neighboring land to
232
subside. An owner might even be forced to construct a wall to
233
prevent her land from eroding onto another’s land.
The duty to maintain retaining walls is a duty attached to the
ownership of the property on which the wall is situated, that is, it runs
with the land. Not only is the owner who built the wall responsible for
234
its maintenance, but so too are her successors. In this important
respect, the affirmative duty to maintain retaining walls goes beyond
the typical negative duty not to interfere with lateral support. Most
courts hold that subsequent owners are not liable for their
235
predecessors’ withdrawal of lateral support. Even if the effects of
the withdrawal are felt during the current owner’s tenure (that is, only
then does the neighboring land subside), she is not responsible for
excavations performed earlier. Liability attaches to the excavating
236
owner, not to the land. Thus, in most states, if an owner excavated
and removed support for neighboring land, her successor is freed
from any duty. If, however, that owner replaced said support with a
237
retaining wall, the successor carries a duty to maintain the wall. This
result is best explained when support duties are conceived as duties to
maintain. An owner is subject to a duty to maintain the support

230. E.g., Kelley v. Falangus, 388 P.2d 223, 224 (Wash. 1964); Dyer v. St. Paul, 8 N.W. 272,
272 (Minn. 1881).
231. Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 223 (W. Va. 1982).
232. E.g., Gorton v. Schofield, 41 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 1942); Urosevic v Hayes, 590 S.W.2d
77, 79 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979).
233. Fabbri v. Regis Forcier, 330 A.2d 807, 809–10 (R.I. 1975).
234. Gorton, 41 N.E.2d at 15.
235. Keck v. Longoria, 771 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Ark. Ct. App. 1989); Spoo v. Garvin, 32 S.W.2d
715, 716 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930). But see Gladin v. Von Engeln, 575 P.2d 418, 421–22 (Colo. 1978).
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 817 cmt. j (emphasis added) (“The person
liable under the rule . . . is the actor who withdraws the naturally necessary support.”).
237. See Frederick v. Burg, 148 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Pa. 1957) (explicitly drawing the
distinction between the subsequent owner’s lack of liability for excavation work done by her
predecessor and her liability for maintaining a retaining wall constructed by that predecessor).
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provided by her land to neighboring soil as that support existed at the
238
time she assumed ownership.
b. Affirmative Covenants. Servitudes for support are “natural.”
Other kinds of servitudes must be created by private parties. Yet
these other servitudes may also institute a property-law duty to
maintain. For, although non-natural servitudes are always traceable
to an agreement between owners, they are rights and duties in
property, rather than in contract, meaning that they run with the
239
land. In other words, an owner must abide by the servitude even if
she herself was not a party to the agreement creating it. Servitudes
that oblige all future owners to perform an act on the land—for
240
example, maintain it—are called affirmative covenants.
Examples of affirmative covenants are obligations to provide
241
242
heat to a building, to conserve a historic structure, to care for a
243
244
fence, to keep a sewer in good condition, to maintain a bridge and
245
246
replace it if destroyed, to landscape, and to preserve land in a
247
manner preventing declines in the value of surrounding properties.
The most popular affirmative covenant nowadays is an obligation to
pay homeowners association fees to fund the maintenance of
248
common premises.
The onus on an owner of land subject to an affirmative covenant
to maintain can be weighty. She will be obliged to carry the costs of
abiding by the covenant, regardless of her choice to refrain from using
the land, and even when the land cannot be used. The case of Pocono
249
v. MacKenzie represents this extreme result. The MacKenzies held

238. Note, however, that the dilapidated state of the wall at the time the land was purchased
by the defendant does not immunize her from liability. Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 225 (W.
Va. 1982).
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.3(1) (2000).
240. Id. § 1.3(2).
241. Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty, 164 N.E.2d 832, 835 (N.Y. 1959).
242. Historic Green Springs v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 842 (E.D. Va. 1980).
243. E.g., Concklin v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 134 N.Y.S. 191, 192 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
244. Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 749 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D.R.I. 1990).
245. E.g., Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 212 S.E.2d 715, 718
(Va. 1975).
246. E.g., Skyline Woods Homeowners Ass’n v. Broekemeier, 758 N.W.2d 376, 390 (2008).
247. See id.
248. E.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798
(N.Y. 1938).
249. Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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vacant land subject to an affirmative covenant to pay association fees.
After purchasing the land, they discovered that it could not meet
municipal sewage requirements, and therefore could not be
developed. Consequently, they were not only unable to use the land,
but they also could not dispose of it. When the land was put on the
market, no buyers materialized; when offered to the homeowners
association as a gift, the association declined; and, when property
250
taxes were withheld, the locality refused to take possession. Still, the
court decided that the MacKenzies must abide by the affirmative
covenant and pay the association fees. As a result, the property
became a negative-value asset.
Affirmative covenants lead to a similar eventuality in other, less
extreme, scenarios. For example, in several cases owners were forced
to maintain golf courses in accordance with an affirmative covenant
251
even when the courses became unprofitable. In these and similar
cases involving affirmative covenants, courts have held that as long as
the covenant—that mandates the maintenance of a golf course,
payment of fees for maintenance of common premises, or any other
obligation—meaningfully benefits others, it must be enforced against
252
the owner.
c. Easements. As seen, the law of servitudes benefits the holder
of a servitude—for example, of a support right or of an affirmative
covenant—by empowering her to force the owner of the subjected
land, known as the “servient estate,” to maintain that land. With
respect to another category of servitudes, easements, the law of
servitudes performs the reverse. Easements are servitudes whose
holders have the right to enter another’s land and do something on
253
it. Examples of easements are a right of way or a right to install
pipes. An easement thereby benefits its holder. But it also places a
duty on her. The holder of an easement may not exercise her
easement in a way that places an undue burden upon the servient
254
estate. This restriction engenders a duty to repair and maintain an
easement to prevent injury to the servient estate. For example, the
owner of a right of way may not stand idle as the cattle guards along
250. Id. at 235.
251. E.g., Heatherwood Holdings LLC v. First Commercial Bank, 61 So.3d 1012, 1024 (Ala.
2010); Shalimar Ass’n v. D.O.C. Enters. Ltd., 688 P.2d 682, 683 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.10 cmt. c (2000).
253. Id. § 1.2(1).
254. Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 371 P.2d 647, 656–57 (Nev. 1962).
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the road deteriorate and fail to protect livestock on the servient
255
estate. The owner of an irrigation easement may not allow it to
overgrow with vegetation, become obstructed by debris, and gush
256
with polluted water. Thus, easements law, albeit mostly concerned
with privileging a holder of an easement to use another’s land, also
places on the holder of an easement the duty to maintain the portions
of land that her easement covers.
5. Landlord–Tenant Law. Servitudes mandating maintenance
play a key role in one specialized area of property law: landlord–
tenant law. The lease creating the tenancy is a series of covenants—
257
obligations between the landlord and the tenant. In addition to
these explicit and voluntary promises, there are implicit covenants
that courts or legislatures insert into all leases, regardless of the
parties’ desires. Many such legally created obligations impose on
landlords assorted duties to maintain. These include a duty to
258
maintain the building’s common spaces in a safe condition and to
259
protect tenants’ premises from third parties’ illegal activities. Most
prominently, the obligations to which a landlord is subjected by law
encompass a warranty of habitability: the unwaivable obligation to
260
maintain leased premises in livable conditions. The warranty, often
drawing on detailed municipal codes, consists of specific and rigorous
requirements, such as the provision of heat and water, garbage
261
removal, and the insulation of windows.
Given that the warranty is inherent to landlord–tenant law, the
potent duty to maintain it institutes endures for as long as the
landlord–tenant relationship lasts. Thus, owners who seek to evade
the duty—because they cannot afford, or do not wish, to maintain
their properties—can simply opt to avoid or abandon the rental

255. Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1982).
256. City of Turlock v. Bristow, 284 P. 962, 965 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930); see also Powers v.
Grenier Constr. Inc., 524 A.2d 667, 669 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (concluding the drainageeasement holder was liable for flooding the servient estate due to his failure to repair the
drainage system).
257. WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, at 244 (3d ed.
2000) (defining tenancy).
258. E.g., King v. G & M Realty Corp., 370 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Mass. 1977).
259. E.g., Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 346 A.2d 76, 77 (N.J. 1975).
260. The warranty was first recognized in Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970). It has since been adopted by most states. ROBERT SCHOSHINSKI,
AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:16, n.30 (1980).
261. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 326 (1972).
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market. In some jurisdictions, however, this course of action is
unavailable because owners’ ability to control their statuses as
landlords is restricted. Anti-eviction laws (enumerating allowable
262
causes for removing tenants), rent-control laws (setting maximum
263
rates for rent increases),
or condominium-conversion laws
(regulating the transformation of rental units into individually owned
264
units), limit a landlord’s ability to terminate a landlord–tenant
265
relationship, even after the lease expires. Such laws might even ban
the owner from removing the unit from the market and moving into it
266
herself. In tandem with obligations to maintain leased properties,
any such restriction on the owner’s ability to terminate leases
generates a duty to maintain units that is costly, and in radical cases,
even impossible, to escape.
6. State and Local Statutory Maintenance Obligations. The duties
a landlord owes to her tenant draw on both common-law and
statutory origins. There are also rules imposing a detailed duty to
maintain that are fully based on statute. These rules supplement the
common-law doctrines reviewed earlier in this Section. Building laws
and ordinances, which most states and cities now boast, present a
prime example. They enforce maintenance standards on all owners
regardless of the use to which they put their property (that is, even if
the property is not leased) through fines and repair orders.
Although the specific maintenance standards vary by
jurisdiction, their characteristics can be gauged through Chicago’s

262. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 (LexisNexis 2014).
263. E.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2101.
264. Condominium-conversion statutes can, for example, place a moratorium on
conversions, assure tenants a right to buy their units for a set price, or forbid eviction of certain
tenants. See, e.g., 1983 Mass. Acts 1926; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.22–65 (West 2000 & Supp.
2014).
265. When challenged by landlords as takings, these laws were mostly deemed
constitutional. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54, 157–58 (1921) (upholding rent control);
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 524–25, 549 (1992) (upholding rent-control law prohibiting
eviction of mobile-home dwellers); San Remo Hotel v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal.
2002) (upholding an ordinance mandating payments by the owners of single-occupancy hotel
units before converting them to tourist use).
266. See, e.g., Flynn v. Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335, 337, 339–40 (Mass. 1981) (upholding a
statute that prohibited a condominium owner from reoccupying one of his own units); Puttrich
v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842, 843–44 (App. Div. 1979) (upholding a similar statute in New Jersey). But
see Cwynar v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 233, 238–40, 245–46 (2001)
(holding that a similar ordinance could constitute a taking).
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267

building ordinance. Chicago requires owners to keep their buildings
268
or units in “a clean, sanitary and safe condition” and “exterminate
269
any insects, rodents or other pests therein.” Every lot must “be
graded and drained so as to prevent the accumulation of stagnant
270
water.” The foundations must fully support the building, and all
271
exterior walls and roofs must be whole. In addition, like many of its
272
peers, Chicago singles out vacant properties for particularly invasive
treatment. The owners of such properties must, among other
273
obligations, register their properties with the city and pay fees;
274
275
retain an occupied local address; carry liability insurance; keep all
276
grass below ten inches high; preserve windows, doors, porches,
277
278
decks, and stoops in sound condition; light exit areas; prevent
279
280
trash accumulation; and secure the building. Importantly, these

267. Comparable codes have been adopted in other cities. See PHILA. CODE §§ PM-304–305
(2007); HOUS. TEX., ORDINANCE §§ 10-361, 363, 364 (2011), available at
http://www.houstontx.gov/codes. Similar statewide codes have also been adopted. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 1226.1 (adopted 2010).
268. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 13-196-620 (a) (2013).
269. Id. § 13-196-620(c).
270. Id. § 13-196-600.
271. Id. § 13-196-530.
272. E.g., PHILA. CODE § PM-306; L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 91.8904. In addition, in a law
applicable to Los Angeles and San Diego, the California legislature shortened the notice period
required before the enforcement agency may act against a vacant, substandard, single-family
dwelling. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17980.9 (West 2006). Indiana adopted a different
approach. Under its Unsafe Building Law, vacant and unmaintained properties are defined as
unsafe buildings, and are thus susceptible to the plethora of administrative sanctions available
for governments dealing with unsafe buildings. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-4(a)(6) (LexisNexis
2009 & Supp. 2014). Further, the Indiana law specifically encourages local governments to
adopt, with respect to such structures, “maintenance and repair standards appropriate for the
community.” IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-9-4.5 (LexisNexis 2009). Michigan established special
administrative-hearing bureaus to adjudicate and impose sanctions on the violations of local
codes designated as “blight” violations. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 117.4q (West 2006 & Supp.
2014). Congress has considered providing federal funding to municipalities for expanded and
improved code enforcement, as well as other local mechanisms for dealing with vacant
properties. The Community Regeneration, Sustainability, and Innovation Act of 2009. (S. 453
H.R. 932 (111th)), reintroduced as The Community Regeneration, Sustainability, and
Innovation Act of 2011 (H.R. 790).
273. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 13-12-125(a)(1).
274. Id. § 13-12-125(a)(2).
275. Id. § 13-12-125(c).
276. Id. § 13-12-135(a)(1).
277. Id. § 13-12-135(b)(3); § 13-12-135(b)(6).
278. Id. § 13-12-135(b)(7).
279. Id. § 13-12-135(c)(1).
280. Id. § 13-12-140.
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and other building code obligations may be enforced against an
281
owner whether or not the neglect presents a danger to outsiders.
These extensive maintenance obligations under state and local laws
illustrate that the characterization of property rights as encompassing
a freedom to let property lie fallow or gather dust is simply
inaccurate—at least in urban or suburban settings.
7. Farming Law. Although the owners of rural lands are mostly
not subject to building codes, they too cannot let their lands lie fallow
or gather dust. Like all other owners, they are subject to negligence
and nuisance liability for damages arising from the state of their
282
lands. There is solely one category of rural cases in which courts
remain loath to impose liability in negligence or nuisance: cases in
which damages result from the spread of noxious fauna or flora from
283
neglected farmland. However, even in such instances, owners are
not shielded from the specter of legal responsibility. Since the early
twentieth century, statutes impose a duty to maintain in many of
these situations, sometimes going as far as to criminalize a
284
farmholder’s failure to combat wild plants. Thus, owners’ liberty to
neglect, or let their rural land lie fallow, is very limited.
Indeed, the particular practice of letting rural land lie fallow has
become the subject of legal challenges. When agricultural land is
farmed ineffectively or not at all, sand, soil, and weeds can blow onto
neighbors’ lands. Nevertheless, at an earlier time, courts were
unwilling to entertain negligence or other claims against farmers who
285
let their land lie fallow—cleared, unirrigated, and unplowed. Over
the years, however, courts began to condition their approval of such
practices on proof that leaving land fallow for a certain time is “in

281. Vill. of Ringwood v. Foster, 932 N.E.2d 461, 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
282. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
283. A late nineteenth-century English judge dismissed such a case with two sentences: “I
never heard of such an action as this. There can be no duty as between adjoining occupiers to
cut the thistles, which are the natural growth of the soil.” Giles v. Walker [1890] 24 L.R. 656, 657
(Q.B. Div.); see also Boarts v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 182 P.2d 246, 248 (1947) (holding “no duty
rested on the defendant to cut or destroy weeds”); Belhumeur v. Zilm, 157 N.H. 233, 236 (2008)
(holding the owner not liable for the “independent acts of wild animals”—in this case, the
actions of the bees nesting in a tree on her property).
284. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 15-16-7-1–15 (LexisNexis 2008) (noxious weed
eradication); id. §§ 15-16-8-1–14 (LexisNexis 2008) (destruction of certain detrimental plants);
Vance v. S. Kan. Ry. of Tex., 152 S.W. 743, 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (interpreting a statute
making it illegal to permit Russian thistles to go to seed).
285. E.g., Stewart v. Birchfield, 114 P. 999 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1911).
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accordance with good farming methods” in the specific area and for
286
the particular crop. This requirement renders precarious the legal
status of neglectful owners who let their rural land lie fallow for no
287
persuasive reason. This line of decisions amplifies the duty to
maintain that already burdens rural owners, and specifically
undermines the supposed general right to let one’s property lie
fallow.
B. Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain Through Loss of Property
The law subjects owners to a duty to maintain their lands
because, as seen in the preceding Section, neglectful owners are
vulnerable to monetary judgments or injunctions. The law also, as this
Section illustrates, threatens such inattentive owners with the
potential loss of their land. This sanction is often harsher than
financial liability. For, when imposed, it leaves the owner without her
property and, at least in most cases, without its worth. Yet there are
circumstances in which financial liability is the more severe sanction,
even though it leaves the owner with her property. When an owner’s
land can be put to no productive use—that is, when it is valueless—its
loss causes the owner no harm, whereas imposing any financial
liability on the land transforms it into a negative-value asset. Because
288
in American law owners cannot relinquish their land, negative-value
land drains the owner’s other resources. The predicament of the
holders of Detroit properties offered for one dollar serves as an
289
example. These owners would, in all likelihood, welcome a rule
divesting them of their lands (and, as explained below, Michigan may
290
indeed formulate such a rule). Theirs is an exceptional case
however. Most lands are not valueless, and, accordingly, most owners
are apprehensive about losing their land. Hence rules imposing the
duty to maintain through potential loss of land are effective tools
promoting the duty. These rules include eminent domain, improving
trespasser, adverse possession, and nuisance abatement and property
rehabilitation statutes.

286. Preston v. Schrenk, 295 P.2d 272, 273 (Idaho 1956); Hoover v. Horton, 209 S.W.2d 646,
649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Robinson v. Whitelaw, 364 P.2d 1085, 1085 (Utah 1961).
287. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners § 32 (cautioning that such practices are
unlikely to be upheld).
288. Peñalver, supra note 28.
289. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
290. See infra note 323.
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1. Eminent Domain. Eminent domain is the government’s power
291
to take private property for public uses. The government can take
whichever properties are necessary for the planned public use,
292
However,
irrespective of the properties’ level of upkeep.
undermaintained properties are, and always were, particularly
293
attractive candidates for exercises of the eminent-domain power.
Indeed, the federal Constitution incentivizes governments to target
these properties because of the two restrictions it places on eminent
294
domain.
First, under the federal Constitution, a government
condemning property must pay just compensation, equaling the
295
market value of the property. The value of the property is higher
when the property is well-maintained, and therefore, the law
encourages a government to take a neglected property, rather than
one that is well-maintained, when either can serve a public project.
An even stronger incentive for the government to select
neglected properties is created by the second requirement for a
constitutional exercise of the eminent-domain power: that the land be
296
taken for a “public use.” Justifiably or not, government officials
routinely and successfully claim that taking neglected properties is
inherently a public use, regardless of the nature of the government’s
297
eventual use of the land. Moreover, during the first decade and a
half of the twenty-first century, as criticism grew of the taking of
properties and their transfer to private developers, states amended
their laws to limit the reach of takings for such economic

291. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1875).
292. Nat’l Docks Ry. v. Cent. R.R., 32 N.J. Eq. 755, 763 (1880) (“[The power of eminent
domain] is primarily an absolute one . . . . In the constituted government of this state, the right
of exercising it has been confided to the legislature, restricted by only two conditions: one, that
compensation shall be made to the owner of the property taken; the other, that the use for
which property may be taken shall be a public use. In other respects it is without limit.”).
293. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, ¶ 1 (“The clearance, replanning, development or
redevelopment of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which private
property may be taken . . . .”).
294. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
295. See id. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”)
296. Id.
297. For an overview and critique of this position, see generally Steven Eagle, Does Blight
Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007); see also New Orleans Redevelopment
Auth. v. Burgess, 16 So. 3d 569, 583–85 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the expropriation of
blighted property served a public purpose, and thus did not violate the Louisiana Constitution,
even though ownership was to be transferred to a private third party).
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298

development to “blighted properties” alone. Elsewhere, state courts
299
interpreted their constitutions similarly,
and four dissenting
Supreme Court Justices read the federal Constitution in a
300
corresponding vein.
Statutory definitions of the “blighted” conditions that legitimize
takings for economic development under these new restrictions
encompass most failures to maintain land. In Alabama, for example, a
property is blighted if it is dilapidated, unsanitary, overcrowded, a fire
hazard, disconnected from utilities or sewage, overgrown with
301
noxious weeds, a haven for rodents, or a dumping ground.
302
and
Definitions of blight can be broader and vaguer still,
consequently, owners who fail to meet a not-trifling maintenance
standard are vulnerable to takings for economic development—
takings against which owners maintaining their land are now immune.
Thus, current rules expand eminent domain’s role as a tool enforcing
a duty to maintain. Neglectful owners are subject to a heightened risk
of land loss for traditional public projects, and in many states, they
are the sole owners subject to the risk of land loss for economic
development.
2. Improving Trespasser. When a private owner fails to maintain
her land, the risk that title will be removed and vested in the
government increases. So does the likelihood that title will be lost in
favor of another private individual. One doctrine producing this result
is the law of the improving trespasser. When an unauthorized
individual makes improvements—say, builds structures—on another’s
land, she is committing trespass, regardless of the land’s prior
303
304
condition. Still, in most states the owner cannot remove the
298. E.g., Act of Aug. 25, 2006, 2006 Ala. Acts 584 (codified as ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2014)); Act of June 14, 2006, 2006 Iowa Legis. Serv. 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 1001, § 3
(West) (codified as amended at IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22 (West 2008 & Supp. 2014)); Act of
Sept. 1, 2005, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (codified as TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3)
(West 2008 & Supp. 2014)).
299. E.g., Wayne Cnty. v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004); Karesh v. City Council of
Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1978).
300. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 498–502 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
301. ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(c).
302. E.g., Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1143 (Ohio 2006) (striking down an
ordinance that applied too vague a definition of the phrase “deteriorating area”).
303. Trespass is “a physical intrusion upon the land of another without the proper
permission.” Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (citation omitted). An object
can physically intrude, and hence, unauthorized construction of a building on another’s land
constitutes trespass. See id.
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trespasser and keep those improvements. As the recently adopted
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment explains,
the trespasser who mistakenly improved another’s land “has a claim
306
in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”
To prevent unjust enrichment, a court may order the owner to
pay the trespasser for the improvements she made to the land.
Alternatively, the court may force the owner to sell the land to the
307
trespasser in exchange for the land’s market value. A court will
award one of these remedies if it concludes that when balanced
against the interests of the owner, the trespasser’s interests prevail.
The different balancing tests vary in name and origin—some are
statutory, others judicial—but under all of them the owner is more
likely to lose her land (that is, be forced to convey it to the trespasser)
308
if the land is unimproved or undermaintained.
A major factor a court considers before ruling that the balancing
favors the trespasser is the extent of loss the owner will sustain if her
land is awarded to the trespasser. Such loss is small in cases of
309
unimproved land, especially when the owner cannot show a plan to
310
maintain the land. In addition, courts place much weight on the
timing of the owner’s complaint against the trespasser. If the owner
311
delays, courts are hostile to her request to preserve title. An owner

304. In the past, the rule was different. E.g., Geragosian v. Union Realty, 193 N.E. 726, 728
(Mass. 1935) (“The facts [sic] that the aggrieved owner suffers little or no damage from the
trespass . . . [or] that the wrongdoer acted in good faith and would be put to disproportionate
expense by removal of the trespassing structures . . . are ordinarily no reasons for denying an
injunction. Rights in real property cannot ordinarily be taken from the owner at a valuation . . . .
The general rule is that the owner of land is entitled to an injunction for the removal of
trespassing structures.” (citations omitted)).
305. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 82–85 (2004).
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011).
307. See Rzeppa v. Seymour, 203 N.W. 62, 63 (Mich. 1925).
308. For different balancing tests, see generally Culbreath v. Parker, 717 So. 2d 430 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998) (“balancing the equities”); Golden Press v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1951)
(“relative hardship” test); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.3 (West 1980 & Supp. 2014) (requiring
courts to award relief that “is consistent with substantial justice to the parties under the
circumstances”).
309. E.g., Golden Press, 235 P.2d at 596; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 cmt. a (2011) (“The . . . showing of unjust enrichment . . . may be
very strong, particularly where the value of the improvements greatly exceeds the value of the
unimproved property.”).
310. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.4 (West 1980) (“[T]he court shall take into consideration
any plans the owner of the land may have for the use or development of the land . . . .”).
311. E.g., Myers v. Yingling, 279 S.W.3d 83 (Ark. 2008); Stewart Sterk, Strict Liability and
Negligence in Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2129, 2156–57 (2012).
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is thus required to maintain, or at least police, her land often enough
to promptly spot the improving trespasser. Moreover, by actually
maintaining her land, the owner might prevent trespassing
improvements altogether, because it is much harder, and sometimes
physically impossible, to improve land already improved. For
example, a trespasser cannot build a structure where one has already
been built or clear a field that has already been cleared.
As originally conceived by courts and legislatures, the balancing
test applied in improving trespasser cases is meant not to impose a
duty to maintain, but to prevent unjust enrichment. Nonetheless,
because of the factors used to justify forcing the owner to sell the land
to the trespasser, the test’s actual effect is the promotion of a duty to
maintain.
3. Adverse Possession. Another doctrine carrying the same effect
is adverse possession. The impact of adverse possession on an owner
is more unsettling than that of the improving trespasser rules or the
eminent-domain power. When losing her land through the latter
doctrines, the owner is paid its market value, by the trespasser or the
government, respectively. In contrast, when losing her land through
adverse possession, the owner receives no compensation.
For this dire fate to befall an owner, the requirements of adverse
possession must be met. A person must prove unauthorized, actual,
exclusive, continuous, and open possession of the owner’s land for a
312
statutorily set period of time. Unlike improving trespasser rules,
adverse possession’s focus is not on the value of improvements the
313
trespasser made, but rather, on the passage of time. However, like
the improving trespasser doctrine, adverse possession incentivizes an
owner to maintain her land, as an intruder is likelier to meet the
requirements of adverse possession, and win the owner’s land, when
that land is neglected.
Inevitably, it is easier to actually possess another’s land for a
lengthy period of time, as required for adverse possession, when that
land is neglected. In such circumstances, entry barriers to the land
and detection risks while on the land are lower. The actual-possession
requirement thus often serves as a proxy singling out neglectful

312. See, e.g., Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 781–82 (Alaska 2000).
313. See Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1990) (“Whether a claimant’s
physical acts upon the land are sufficiently continuous, notorious and exclusive does not
necessarily depend on the existence of significant improvements . . . .”).
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owners. An owner who could not be bothered to keep intruders off
her land for the statutory adverse-possession period is unlikely to
314
have been actively maintaining it in other respects. Adverse
possession’s further requirement that the intruder’s possession be
open is particularly geared toward protecting an owner who
maintains her land: an intruder openly possessing the land is apparent
315
to an owner attending to it. Moreover, if the owner maintains the
land, it will often be impossible for the possessor to satisfy the
adverse-possession requirement of exclusive possession. When the
owner maintains the land, the intruder cannot argue that she
excluded the owner. Thus, the intruder’s possession is viewed as
shared with the owner, rather than exclusive, and the adverse
316
possession claim falters. In sum, because it requires actual, open,
and exclusive possession by an intruder, adverse possession
encourages an owner to maintain her land, or at least periodically
inspect it, to impede possession by unauthorized individuals.
4. Nuisance Abatement and Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation
Statutes. As with common-law rules inflicting financial liability on
neglectful owners, the traditional common-law rules exposing these
owners to potential loss of land are amplified by legislative initiatives.
The most straightforward of such initiatives are the nuisanceabatement statutes. As explained in Part II.A, an undermaintained
317
property may constitute a public nuisance. In common law, the
sanction accompanying this tort was damages or an injunction.
Nowadays, plaintiffs may seek yet another remedy set by statute:
abatement of the nuisance through the taking of the neglected
property. Courts may order the property sealed and ban the owner
318
from using it for one to several years. Once that time elapses, the
314. Peñalver, supra note 28, at 210.
315. E.g., Nome, 799 P.2d at 309 (“Use consistent with ownership which gives visible
evidence of the claimant’s possession, such that the reasonably diligent owner ‘could see that a
hostile flag was being flown over his property’ is sufficient [to prove notoriety].” (quoting Shilts
v. Young, 567 P.2d 769, 776 (Alaska 1977))).
316. Smith v. Tippett, 569 A.2d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 1990) (“[T]he adverse claimant’s
possession cannot be shared with the true owner.” (quoting J.P. HAND & J.C. SMITH,
NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 6.06, at 135 (1988))).
317. See supra Part II.A.
318. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3901–3904 (2007 & Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.3825 (West 2013). Individuals seeking nuisance abatement must petition the court and rely
on a statute. See Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Holland, 993 N.E.2d 184, 193 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (denying claimant’s contention that he enjoys a citizen’s right to abate a nuisance, a right
which empowered him to take over a vacant house in foreclosure).
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owner regains title provided she pays all expenses related to the
abatement of the nuisance. Often, she is also obliged to post a bond
319
assuring the nuisance shall not resume. Many states limit these
remedies to cases in which the neglected property is a hub for illegal
320
uses, such as gambling, drugs, or prostitution.
In a still more recent trend dating to the past decade, some states
adopted legislation subjecting all neglected properties, not just those
accommodating illegal activities, to such treatment. For example, the
Ohio nuisance-abatement statute defines public nuisances as
including deteriorated buildings, and empowers any interested party
to petition the court for the appointment of a receiver to abate the
321
nuisance. The receiver is tasked with maintaining the property, and
322
may sell it to fund her efforts. Indiana introduced an expedited
process for the forced tax sale of abandoned properties, which limits
323
the right an owner otherwise has to redeem her property. Iowa
represents an even more extreme example. A recent amendment to
its statutes empowers a city in which an abandoned building is located
to petition the court to enter judgment awarding the city clean title to
324
the property.

319. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3904 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3840 (West
2013).
320. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1270
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2013).
321. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.41 (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).
322. Id.
323. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4 (LexisNexis 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-1(a)(2)
(LexisNexis 2013). Indiana also bans certain entities, which are unlikely to develop the
abandoned lands, from purchasing properties in the tax sale. See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-11-16
(LexisNexis 2013) (“A person who owes delinquent taxes, special assessments, penalties,
interest, or costs directly attributable to a prior tax sale on a trace of real property . . . may not
purchase, receive, or lease a tract that is offered in a sale, exchange, or lease under this
chapter.”).
324. IOWA CODE ANN. § 657A.10A (West Supp. 2014). The special task force appointed by
the President to explore blight in Detroit recommended that Michigan adopt a similar measure
to reinforce the city’s power to use nuisance proceedings to demolish blighted properties or take
title from their owners. See DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK TEAM, supra note 121. Detroit
was actually the site of the first such measure in 2005: the Wayne County Nuisance Abatement
Program (NAP) was empowered to pursue neglectful owners and take title of their property
through court action. Wayne Cnty. Exec. v. Acorn Inv. Co., Nos. 248925, 248926, 248927,
248928, 2005 WL 17764, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2005). Though the program was hailed as a
success, the county discontinued it due to budgetary constraints in 2010. Dustin Walsh, Wayne
County Wins 11 Awards from National Association of Counties, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (July
20, 2010), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20100720/free/100729992/wayne-county-wins-11awards-from-national-association-of-counties. In April 2014, the newly elected mayor of Detroit
launched a neighborhood-rebuilding program that seeks to force property owners to

SHOKED IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

11/18/2014 6:30 PM

488

[Vol. 64:437

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

Illinois, which similarly enables local governments to gain title
325
for abandoned properties, has further adopted a supplementary,
and different, approach to reintegrating undermaintained properties.
In Illinois, governments are not the only entities now entitled to take
possession of such properties. The Illinois Abandoned Housing
Rehabilitation Act empowers nonprofit organizations to petition
courts for permission to take possession of abandoned properties and
326
rehabilitate them for low- or moderate-income housing. An owner
may seek to restore her interest in the property, but she must first
reimburse the organization for its expenditures and for any increase
327
in the property’s value. If the owner delays for more than two years,
328
she loses the property irreparably.
These different statutes enable local governments and nonprofit
organizations to take over neglected land and maintain it. The owner
loses, permanently or temporarily, her land or the right to use it.
Even though she is thereby deprived of her property, none of these
statutes offer compensation. Although the Constitution mandates
compensation for the denial of all economically beneficial use of
329
private land, courts have upheld these arrangements because they
330
In other words, precisely because the
target nuisances.
rehabilitate vacant homes on their properties through the threat of otherwise losing those
properties to the Detroit Land Bank under nuisance-abatement laws. Detroit’s Neighborhood
Rebuilding Program Kicks Off in Marygrove Community, CITY OF DETROIT (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.detroitmi.gov/News/tabid/3196/ctl/ReadDefault/mid/4561/ArticleId/445/
Default.aspx.
325. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-31-1(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014).
326. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3 (West 2008).
327. Id. § 50/7.
328. This is so provided that the nonprofit uses the property for low- or moderate-income
housing for at least ten years. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/9 (West 2008). In another new law,
adopted in 2010, Illinois empowers localities to initiate a forced sale of distressed
condominiums, defined as parcels “containing condominium units which are operated in a
manner or have conditions which may constitute a danger, blight, or nuisance to the
surrounding community or to the general public.” 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/14.5 (West
Supp. 2014). Detroit has experimented with another tactic to promote the rehabilitation of
vacant properties. In May 2014, the city began auctioning vacant houses it owns at the starting
price of $1000. Buyers must inhabit the house and commit to repairing it within six months. If
the house is not up to code within six months, the buyer loses the house (and the money she
paid for it). See Building Detroit, DETROIT LAND BANK AUTH., http://www.buildingdetroit.org
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
329. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
330. E.g., Empire State Ins. Co. v. Chafetz, 278 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir.1960) (“The exercise of
the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance . . . is very
different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without
due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property
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arrangements penalize neglectful owners and enforce a duty to
maintain, they count as legitimate exercises of the state’s police
power.
C. Summary: Property Law’s Duty To Maintain and Its Relationship
to Rights to Destroy and Abandon
Each of the doctrines reviewed in this Part imposes on an owner
a duty to maintain her property up to a minimum standard. When a
statutory duty (for example, an implied warranty of habitability or a
building code) applies, an owner is subject to a detailed list of
obligations regarding her property’s condition. In the absence of a
specific statutory duty, an owner remains subject to the duty to
maintain as formulated in different common-law rules, which urge her
to periodically inspect her property, prevent blight, and exercise at
least a reasonable standard of care to avoid the emergence of
dangerous conditions or interferences with neighbors’ enjoyment of
their lands. Each doctrine creates an incentive: maintaining her
property is an effective (and sometimes the only) way for an owner to
avoid the imposition of financial liability, or loss of land, by the
specific doctrine. The intensity and details of the incentive vary across
doctrines. So does the identity of the party who can seek a remedy
against the owner under each doctrine. Sometimes it is a harmed
individual, other times it is any individual or an individual who meets
certain conditions, and elsewhere it is the relevant local government.
But the end effect is the same. Cumulatively, these doctrines
construct a legal reality in which the duty to maintain is pervasive. An
owner is simply not free to let her land lie fallow or gather dust. Any
such decision may entail legal costs.

is taken away from an innocent owner.” (quoting Pasternack v. Bennett, 190 So. 56, 59 (Fla.
1939))); Johnson v. City of Prichard, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1319–20 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (finding no
unconstitutional taking or trespass by the government when a city demolished a structure to
abate a nuisance); Embassy Realty Invs., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 976 F. Supp. 2d 931, 940–43
(N.D. Ohio 2013) (same); Keshbro v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 875–77 (Fla. 2001) (holding
that an order of closure issued to a business where illegal activity was taking place pursuant to a
nuisance-abatement statute, was not a taking); LJD Props., Inc. v. Greenville, 753 S.W.2d 204,
207 (Tex. App. 1988) (finding no unconstitutional taking or trespass by the government when a
city demolished a structure to abate a nuisance under the Texas Constitution). These rulings
rely, or can rely, on statements made by the Supreme Court in cases such as Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n. 20 (1987) (“[S]ince no individual
has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has
not ‘taken’ anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.”).
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This unacknowledged limit on ownership’s reach is different
from seemingly similar rights an owner may lack to abandon or
destroy her property. These latter rights have recently attracted
belated and sophisticated scholarly attention, and it is important to
understand the differences between the duty to maintain and these
331
other elements of property law. The difference centers on two
special characteristics of property law. First, property law employs the
term “abandonment” in a manner diverging from the word’s
colloquial understanding. Second, property law does not fold the
moderate right to neglect an asset into the radical right to destroy it.
In common parlance respecting assets, the verbs “to abandon”
and “to neglect” are used interchangeably. In property law,
conversely, the term “abandonment” has a very precise and
constricted meaning. An owner does not legally abandon her
property by neglecting or failing to maintain it. An owner who has
not occupied her land for a lengthy period of time, or who has
allowed it to fall into disrepair, has not necessarily abandoned it as a
legal matter. Legal abandonment requires an actual decision by the
owner to let go of the property. An owner abandons her property
when she chooses to no longer be its owner and acts on that
332
decision. Abandonment thus signifies a mental state of actively
seeking to renounce one’s status as owner—not a mere disregard of
the owned asset.
The law of water rights neatly illustrates this distinction. It
allocates to individuals rights to use water that can later be lost in two
distinct ways: abandonment or forfeiture. Water rights are abandoned
when their owner exhibits intent to relinquish them; water rights are
forfeited when their owner fails to use them. Ergo, an owner who has
expressed no intent to relinquish her water rights cannot lose them
through abandonment, but she might still lose them through
333
forfeiture if she fails to maintain them.
An owner may fail to maintain her property without abandoning
it and thus the duty to maintain is not synonymous with the owner’s
334
inability to legally abandon land. Similarly, the duty to maintain
331. On the right to abandon, see generally Peñalver, supra note 28; Strahilevitz, supra note
12. On the right to destroy, see generally Strahilevitz, supra note 28.
332. E.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (abandoning
easements); Corliss v. Wenner, 34 P.3d 1100, 1104 (Idaho App. 2001) (abandoning goods).
333. See Hawley v. Kansas, 132 P.3d 870, 880 (Kan. 2006) (relying on the abandonment–
forfeiture distinction).
334. In American law, land cannot be abandoned. See supra note 17.
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suggested here is not the equivalent of the lack of a right to destroy.
Professor Lior Strahilevitz defines destruction as the “eliminat[ion]
335
. . . of all otherwise valuable future interests in a . . . thing.”
Naturally, as a practical matter, an owner may fail to maintain her
property without eliminating all its value. More importantly, as a legal
matter, an owner may have a right to destroy her asset, yet still be
obliged to maintain it until its destruction. To illustrate this point,
consider animal law. Under current law, animals are treated as
property and may be destroyed (that is, put to death) by their owners
336
at any point. However, an owner is not free to treat her animal
337
cruelly, and therefore, is not allowed to starve or neglect it. Thus,
although the owner possesses the freedom to destroy her animal, she
338
does not hold the lesser freedom to refrain from maintaining it.
The duty to maintain identified in this Article is thus not the
339
Hohfeldian opposite, or the reverse image, of the privilege to
destroy. Neither is the failure to abide by this duty to maintain
comparable to the abandonment of property. The powerful duty to
maintain emerging from the disparate legal rules reviewed in this Part
is an independent element of American property law and as such, it
must be separately appreciated and explained.

335. Strahilevitz, supra note 28, at 793.
336. GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 24, 44, 128–29 (1995)
(animals are regarded as property and hence may be killed by owners; protective legislation has
never been interpreted to interfere with the unnecessary killing by owners).
337. See The Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1)–(2) (2012). The Animal
Welfare Act does not prohibit exterminating animals, but bans certain forms of abuse and
neglect. Id. (mandating that the Secretary of Agriculture promulgate rules establishing
minimum standards for animal welfare including feeding and exercise); see also State v. Hill, 996
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that although Missouri law does not preclude
owners from intentionally killing their animals in a humane way, it prohibits them from
intentionally causing them suffering).
338. Doctrines reviewed earlier in this Article also illustrate this special feature of property
law that extends to the owner the right to destroy her property while subjecting her to a duty to
maintain it during its existence. Unless it is protected as a historic landmark, a current owner
can destroy a building she owns. See, e.g., J.C. & Assocs. v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778
A.2d 296, 298 (D.C. 2001) (holding that the petitioner was barred from destroying its building,
as it was a historical landmark). However, as long as the building stands, the owner is subject to
the duty to maintain it in accordance with building codes. See supra notes 266–80 and
accompanying text.
339. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
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III. THE NORMATIVE STANDING OF THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN
Part II showed that American property law currently
encompasses a duty to maintain. Scholarly claims to the contrary
notwithstanding, owners have no right to let land lie fallow or gather
dust. But should they? Is American law’s imposition of a duty to
maintain justified? What normative values, if any, does the duty
serve, and how should these values affect our attitude toward the
specific rules enforcing the duty that were surveyed in the preceding
Part?
This Part seeks to answer these questions and demonstrate that
statements about owners’ freedom to let land lie fallow or gather dust
are not solely factually inaccurate, as already seen, but also
normatively unacceptable. This claim appears to challenge Part I’s
analysis, which highlighted the vital role assigned by the different
normative justifications for property to the owner’s immunity from
edicts. But the ensuing examination demonstrates that in actuality,
the different property justifications presented in Part I not only
tolerate the duty to maintain, but necessitate it. The discussion in this
Part concludes by employing this realization to revisit and criticize the
hostile judicial attitude toward new maintenance ordinances enforced
against lenders originally presented in Part I.
But first this Part analyzes each of the normative theories
discussed in Part I—right-based, utilitarian, and relational—in turn,
constructing through each a normative account of the duty to
maintain. The conclusion is that, when correctly understood, each
theory requires a duty to maintain. Nonetheless, some theories
require a broader duty than others. Right-based arguments embrace a
limited duty and hence only some of the legal doctrines surveyed in
Part II are justifiable in the right-based worldview. Utilitarian
theories adopt a much broader vision and accordingly justify almost
all current rules. Relational theories support the widest notion of the
duty and can justify all the legal practices enforcing it. The theories
thus have a cumulative ability to explain the doctrines: each theory
can incorporate the doctrines and explanations provided by the
theory or theories previously surveyed.
This relationship between the theories implies that, as is
inevitable given the natural discrepancy between distinct normative
theories, not all readers should endorse all the duty’s manifestations
revealed in Part II. Specifically, right-based theories profess a strong
individualistic bent, and therefore, approach all property restrictions
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with a generally dim view. Thus, a reader who adheres to a rightbased theory might reject current rules extending the duty to
maintain beyond the minimalist contours that right-based theories
outline. Alternatively, that reader might contemplate justifications for
property drawing on non-right-based arguments: utilitarian or
relational theories.
A. Elements of the Duty To Maintain Explained by Right-Based
Property Theories
1. The Duty To Maintain as Embodying Actual Contracts. The
first group of property theories grounded property in its ability to
promote owners’ individual rights, which, as seen in Part I.A.1, are all
connected to freedom. In accordance, under these theories, a duty to
maintain—or any other affirmative duty placed on an owner—is
justified and must be enforced when the owner freely assumed it of
her own volition. The move from complete freedom (and isolation)—
the state right-based theories idealize—to a state of obligation, must
341
be the result of actual free choice. In other words, the duty to
maintain has to relate to a contract the owner voluntarily entered.
When it does, property law must aid in implementing this exercise of
the owner’s freedom of choice—for, under right-based theories, this is
the law’s function.
The original contract creating the duty to maintain need not be
explicit or detailed for the duty’s enforcement to be justifiable in this
manner under right-based theories. The duty need not be specifically
written into a formal agreement. The test to determine whether the
duty expresses the free agreement of the owner is substantive, not
342
formal. For theories focusing on an individual’s right to freely
340. For example, right-based arguments would limit nuisance liability to cases in which the
defendant is perceived as physically invading the plaintiff’s land. Richard Epstein, Nuisance
Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 57–65 (1979). This
attitude does not reflect the common law, and it is representative of the inevitable, awkward
solutions right-based explanations deliver, given the fact that right-holders are surrounded by
other right-holders. SINGER, supra note 30, at 94, 171–74.
341. 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123–31 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(1690); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 132 (2009).
342. A similar attitude justifies a fiduciary’s duty not to let funds in her possession lie fallow.
This duty is implied into the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship. In re D’EspinayDurtal’s Will, 4 A.D.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957). Accordingly, one court suggested that a
mortgage service company, as the trustee of the investors holding the mortgage, owes the
investors a fiduciary duty to maintain the underlying property. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of
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choose, the defining question is whether the owner is fairly viewed as
choosing a liability—explicitly or implicitly.
A few of the legal doctrines introduced in Part II as instituting
the duty to maintain reflect this normative stance. They impose the
duty on an owner who, in one way or another, is legally conceived as
choosing to assume it. These are the doctrines of waste, easements,
affirmative covenants, and support rights. Whereas the first three
draw on explicit agreements, the final one is grounded in an implicit
agreement.
2. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Draw on
Explicit Contracts. In the easiest cases for right-based justifications,
the duty to maintain can be connected to an actual, explicit contract.
Several of the rules reviewed in Part II fall into this category. The
duty to maintain enforced through the doctrines of waste and
easements is traceable to a voluntary agreement by owners, as both
doctrines are fully contractual. The duty of the present interest holder
not to commit waste is suppletive in that law imposes the duty, even
when not included in the original contract creating the estate, as mere
default. The individuals drafting that contract are free to renounce
the doctrine: the creator of the present interest can empower its
343
holder to commit waste. Similarly, after the creation of the interest,
the holders of the future interests are free at any time to allow the
344
holder of the present interest to commit waste. The law with respect
to the maintenance of easements is identical: those establishing an
easement can agree that the easement’s holder will not be subject to a
345
duty to keep it in good repair. If the parties to the easement fail to

N.Y. v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. HP#115/13, 2013 WL 5336761, at *9 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. Sept. 12, 2013). Similarly, a condominium board owes the owners of the individual units a
fiduciary duty, statutorily or otherwise, read into the declaration establishing the condominium,
to provide for the operation, care, upkeep, maintenance, replacement, and improvement of the
common elements. E.g., Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condo. Owners’ Ass’n, 981 N.E.2d 1069, 1075–76
(Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2012) (holding the condominium board liable for breach of its fiduciary duty
when it failed to make repairs to the common elements that were causing damage to an
individual unit).
343. 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 637, at 682 (Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan
eds., 1968). An exception exists in California, where a statute bars a mortgagor from committing
waste, regardless of the agreement. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929 (West 2012).
344. See Thomas Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in
American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1086 (2011) (“[C]ontractual modifications of
duties toward specific property can be and often are modified [after the creation of the
interest].”).
345. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.13 (2000).
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renounce the duty at that point or later, the law simply assumes they
346
agreed to impose it.
Affirmative covenants are also contractual in nature. A duty to
maintain embodied in a covenant is a duty that two private parties—
in most cases, adjacent owners—established in an agreement between
them. That agreement then runs with the land—hence it is not a mere
347
contract right, but a property right. The agreement can be enforced
against, and by, future owners of the lands—who were not parties to
the original agreement. However, such future owners are legally
viewed as if they did voluntarily consent to the duty contained in the
original agreement. After all, they chose to buy the land knowing that
348
it was subject to the covenant. The law of covenants verifies that the
current owner tacitly agreed to the previously created covenant by
349
mandating that she have notice of it. Hence, as with the rules
respecting waste and the maintenance of easements, affirmative
covenants are grounded in a contract an owner actually and freely
entered, and accordingly, they must be enforced under a right-based
theory of property.
3. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Draw on
Implicit Contracts. The duty to maintain embodied in the law of
support rights, albeit not rooted in any explicit agreement—unlike
duties in waste, easements, and affirmative covenants—is based on an
implicit agreement. Thus it too imposes a duty to maintain that is
grounded in an owner’s free choice. An owner has a duty to maintain
a retaining wall supporting neighboring land because in most cases
she or her predecessor built that wall as a replacement for the natural
350
support furnished to the neighbor’s land.
The owner who
constructed the wall made a choice and an exchange: she chose to

346. See Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746, 749–50 (9th Cir. 1982); 2 G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 428, at 666 (1980 Replacement).
347. SINGER, supra note 102, at 848.
348. For a libertarian writer celebrating restrictions imposed on owners through covenants
in a planned community, see RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 43, 69–
75 (2004).
349. Although historically notice was required for covenants’ enforcement in equity but not
in law, courts now tend to require it in all cases. E.g., Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris,
736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987). In addition, recording statutes protect buyers from servitudes
of which they had no notice. E.g., 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 351 (West 2001).
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 817, cmt. k (1979) (“The [excavating] actor may
avoid liability by furnishing artificial support, such as a retaining wall, sufficient to replace the
natural lateral support withdrawn.”).
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remove the natural support provided to her neighbor’s soil, and
tacitly agreed that instead of being liable for that act, she would
provide her neighbor with a wall performing the function formerly
provided by the unexcavated land. Later, if a subsequent buyer of the
land on which the wall stands saw the wall, that buyer would be put
on notice of that exchange. If the buyer did not actually see the
retaining wall, but could have seen it, she was still on constructive
notice of the exchange. Either way, the subsequent buyer implicitly
351
agreed to the conditions of the exchange when buying the land.
According to right-based arguments for property, this and all other
agreed-upon duties to maintain—found in waste, easements, and the
law of covenants—must be enforced as they evince the owner’s
freedom and right to choose.
B. Elements of the Duty To Maintain Explained by Utilitarian
Property Theories
1. The Duty To Maintain as Embodying a Hypothetical Contract.
Right-based theories explain a few doctrines applying the duty to
maintain by tying those doctrines to an actual contract an owner
freely entered. The other doctrines identified in Part II that impose a
duty to maintain cannot be justified in contractual terms, and thus
352
cannot easily pass muster with right-based theories. Most of these
other doctrines, however, are outgrowths of utilitarian theories, which
view these doctrines as reflecting a hypothetical contract that is
necessary for the promotion of utility. The reason is that an owner’s
decision to not maintain her land generates effects on others, effects
that she does not consider through contractual agreements with those
others due to transaction costs. The doctrines imposing the duty to
maintain embody a hypothetical agreement replacing this
351. This rationale was explicitly stated in the Canadian case, Foster v. Brown, 48 O.L.R. 1,
6 (Can. Ont. App. Div. 1920), which set the rule respecting the duty to maintain retaining walls
that was later adopted by American courts in Gorton v. Schofield, 41 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass.
1942). The Canadian court reasoned that the current owner is liable for failing to maintain a
retaining wall built by her predecessor, but she was not liable for excavations performed by that
predecessor. Id. at 6–7. As in the former case, the court reasoned that she was aware, when she
bought the land, of the duty toward the neighbor. Id. at 3–4.
352. Right-based arguments might justify all other manifestations of the duty to maintain
based on an idea of “harm.” See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Because a neglectful
owner exercises her right in a manner that imposes harms on others, she is interfering with their
rights. But, because this account requires a definition of rights and harm that does not draw on
freedom, but rather relies on utilitarian or relational descriptions of property, it caricatures
right-based explanations and renders them meaningless as an independent category.
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unreachable actual agreement and are thus the only way to assure
that the owner’s decision respecting land maintenance is socially
beneficial—as required by the utilitarian justification for property.
The analysis in this Section unpacks the different elements of this
claim.
As seen in Part I.A.2, utilitarian theories enshrine the owner’s
free decisions regarding the use and maintenance of her land as the
owner experiences the decisions’ costs and benefits, and therefore is
the most likely to make socially efficient decisions. Naturally this
prediction only holds if the owner’s decision does not generate costs
or benefits not experienced by the owner—effects on surrounding
353
lands. Unfortunately, an owner’s decision to neglect her land almost
inevitably carries such external costs. The costs outsiders feel may be
quite extreme. As the task force appointed by the President to aid the
city of Detroit explained in the spring of 2014 when detailing the
rationale behind its arduous endeavor to map each and every
neglected property in the city, “[b]light is a cancer. Blight sucks the
soul out of anyone who gets near it, let alone those who are
unfortunate enough to live with it all around them. Blight is
354
radioactive.”
A blighted, or even simply ill-maintained, property impacts its
355
356
neighbors in many ways. It causes aesthetic damages, as it is likely
to be an eyesore. It may cause physical damages as, for example, trees
can fall onto neighboring land, fires can spread more easily, and
357
dangerous entrants are attracted to the area. It also causes financial

353. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 146, at 49.
354. DETROIT BLIGHT REMOVAL TASK TEAM, supra note 121, at preface.
355. One study found that the presence of an abandoned house on a block reduces the value
of all the other property by an average of $6720. RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, BLIGHT FREE
PHILADELPHIA: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE STRATEGY TO CREATE AND ENHANCE NEIGHBORHOOD
VALUE 21 (2001).
356. NAT’L VACANT PROPS. CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COSTS TO
COMMUNITIES 11 (2005), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/truecosts.pdf (noting the various costs of vacant properties to communities including increased city
services, decreased property values, low quality of life for homeowners, and blight).
357. See supra notes 155–65 and accompanying text; see also Alan Mallach, Abandoned
Property: Effective Strategies to Reclaim Community Assets, HOUSING FACTS & FINDINGS:
SHARING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, Vol. 6,
No. 2 at 6 (Fannie Mae Foundation 2004) (“The National Fire Protection Agency reports that in
1999, an estimated 11,400 structure fires in vacant properties caused 24 civilian deaths, 66
civilian injuries, and $131.5 million in direct property damage.”); William Spelman, Abandoned
Buildings: Magnets for Crime?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 485 (1993) (“Blocks [in Austin, Texas] with
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358

effects as the value of surrounding properties is depressed, local
359
revenue from property tax decreases, and extended public services,
360
such as policing and fire prevention, become required. The owner of
the property does not experience these costs herself, and hence, will
361
often not take them into account in her decision to neglect.
Yet even when externalities are present, as they are here, the
utilitarian prediction that the owner’s decision respecting the use of
her land will produce socially efficient outcomes can persist.
According to traditional utilitarian analysis, the owner will still act
efficiently if the outsiders experiencing the externalities bargain with
the owner and force her to internalize the externalities into her
362
decision. An owner will, for instance, consider her decision’s effects
on others if they pay her to do so. Property law established a tool for
effectuating such contracts by which outsiders make sure that the
owner internalizes the effects her decisions have on them. That tool is
the covenant. A covenant, such as the affirmative covenants reviewed
earlier, is a promise outsiders procure through bargaining whereby an
owner pledges that she and her successors will refrain from activities
those outsiders find detrimental. Covenants further enable founding
collective neighborhood bodies—homeowners associations and

unsecured buildings had 3.2 times as many drug calls [to police], 1.8 times as many theft calls [to
police], and twice the number of violent calls [to police]” as other blocks).
358. Anne Shlay & Gordon Whitman, Research for Democracy: Linking Community
Organizing and Research to Leverage Blight Policy, 5 CITY & CMTY. J. 153, 162 (2006) (finding
that Philadelphia homes within 450 feet of an abandoned property suffered a net decrease in
sales price of between $3542 and $7627).
359. Edward G. Goetz, Kristin Cooper, Bret Thiele & Hin Kin Lam, Pay Now or Pay More
Later: St. Paul’s Experience in Rehabilitating Vacant Housing, CURA REP. 19 (Apr. 1998)
(calculating the decrease in St. Paul, Minnesota’s tax revenue attributable to declining values of
properties surrounding undermaintained lots).
360. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-34, VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING
NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS AND CHALLENGES 42–43 (2011). For example, it is
estimated that foreclosed and undermaintained properties cost Chicago $36 million in
maintenance, security, and administrative costs annually. Dory Rand, Op-Ed., Chicago’s
Housing Recovery Just Got Slower, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., Sep. 4, 2013, http://www.
chicagobusiness.com/article/20130904/OPINION/130909977/chicagos-housing-recovery-just-gotslower (reporting the finding of a study conducted by the Woodstock Institute).
361. To the extent these harms do not always materialize, it is perhaps more accurate to say
that neglect is a risk-producing activity, or omission, operating at a scale that does not match the
size or shape of individually owned pieces of property. See Lee Ann Fennell, Property and HalfTorts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1448 (2007).
362. The argument was famously laid out in Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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363

condominiums —to enforce these promises and to verify that owners
364
do not engage in behaviors negatively affecting others. Indeed, the
extraordinary spread of homeowners associations and condominiums
365
during the second half of the twentieth century is attributable to the
need of American owners, living in an increasingly crowded
environment, for assurances that the surrounding properties would
366
remain well maintained.
This development is hardly surprising. Due to the major
externalities generated whenever a property is neglected, all owners
stand to gain if each takes these effects into account before settling on
a level of maintenance for her property. We should therefore expect
all owners to enter neighborhood agreements in which each assures
her peers that she will maintain her property. Yet despite the promise
of social-welfare gains afforded by homeowners associations and
condominiums, most properties are not subject to them or to
covenants requiring maintenance. The culprit is the major transaction
costs involved in instituting covenants in existing neighborhoods.
Bargaining, as already noted, generally leads to the internalization of
externalities; however, and as is established in economic literature, in
any given case such bargaining may fail to materialize due to
367
transaction costs. Among other things, the individuals affected by a
property owner’s decision may be too dispersed to come together to
negotiate with her, the decision’s effects on any one individual may be
too limited to impel her to alone expend the resources for
negotiations, a forum for negotiations may be lacking, and
antagonism may separate the parties.
A multitude of such transaction costs impede contracts—or,
more accurately, covenants—from forcing the owner to internalize
the effects of neglect. To subject owners to covenants and to an

363. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000) (defining commoninterest communities and their role).
364. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d
1060, 1073 (N.J. 2007) (explaining that homeowners association rules are premised on the
notion that their reciprocal nature benefits the entire community).
365. As of 2012, 323,600 association-governed communities existed in the United States,
housing 63.4 million Americans in 25.9 million units. In 1970, only 10,000 such communities
were in existence, with 2.1 million residents in 701,000 units. See FOUNDATION FOR
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION RESEARCH, STATISTICAL REVIEW 2012, available at http://www.
cairf.org/foundationstatsbrochure.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
366. For a similar explanation of such communities’ appeal, see Robert Ellickson, New
Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 82–83 (1998).
367. See generally Coase, supra note 362 (describing this effect).
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attendant homeowners association or condominium, the assent of all
owners must normally be obtained. In addition to the major
administrative costs associated with this endeavor, it is plagued by
368
inescapable collective-action problems. Any owner who knows she
is likely to cease maintaining her property will hold out. Moreover, all
owners have an incentive to not enter the covenant, which places a
burden of maintenance on them, and stand back as their neighbors
enter the covenant. Given that those neighbors will now maintain
their lands, the recalcitrant adjacent owner who did not enter the
agreement will benefit from the agreement just as much as those who
did, without sharing in the costs. In other words, on the one hand, all
surrounding owners benefit from the enforcement of a promise to
maintain a neighbor’s land and none can be excluded from enjoying
this benefit. On the other hand, enforcement is costly for an owner.
The result is that all owners have an incentive to hold out while
369
others agree, and thus, no covenant will be created. Their appeal
notwithstanding, reciprocal neighborhood contracts imposing a duty
to maintain are almost exclusively therefore a phenomenon reserved
to new developments in which one owner, the developer, owns all
lands, and thus no administrative costs or collective-action problems
370
impede the drafting of covenants.
According to a utilitarian analysis, when transaction costs block
market mechanisms from leading the owner to internalize
externalities into her free decision, as they do in the case of neglectful
371
owners, legal intervention forcing internalization is warranted. The
legal duty to maintain performs that function. It serves the utilitypromoting role of property when it fixes the market failure: creating
for owners in all neighborhoods, including existing neighborhoods,
the neighborhood contract that those owners desire but cannot reach
due to transaction costs. The duty to maintain is thus justifiable as a
hypothetical contract that promotes utility.
Most doctrines reviewed in Part II and not justified in reference
to an actual agreement in Part III.A replace an agreement for
internalizing externalities that parties would have thrashed out had
368. See Robert Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828
(1999) (lamenting the inevitability of collective-action problems).
369. For a similar argument, see Frank Michelman, Political Markets and Community SelfDetermination, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 156 (1978).
370. Nelson, supra note 368, at 828.
371. Peñalver, supra note 70, at 871; see EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 63 (describing how this
rationale affected the evolution of property laws governing the hunting of wild animals).
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Accordingly they are
transaction costs not been present.
endogenous to property in its utilitarian reading. Whether directly or
indirectly, these doctrines set in place a reciprocally advantageous
regime between neighbors, assuring that each internalizes all costs of
her decision not to maintain. Negligence duties toward outsiders, and
the laws of private and public nuisance achieve this goal directly. The
doctrines of eminent domain, building codes, negligence liability
toward trespassers, improving trespasser, and adverse possession do
so indirectly.
2. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Directly
Institute the Hypothetical Contract. Some doctrines enforcing the duty
to maintain are formally set to protect neighbors against the external
effects of an owner’s act, and thus, they are easily perceived and
justified as imposing the hypothetical, mutually beneficial,
neighborhood-maintenance agreement. Negligence duties toward
outsiders explicitly protect neighbors from physical harms that are
neglect’s externalities. As one court stated, “the governing principle”
over the duties of an owner in negligence (as opposed to nuisance),
“is that one must so use his own property as not to injure that of his
373
neighbor.” For example, the duty to prevent conditions aiding in the
374
spread of fire directly safeguards neighboring properties, and the
liability imposed on an owner for the acts of third parties forces an
owner to exercise her control over entrants to her land to protect her
375
neighbors.
For its part, nuisance is specifically defined as an interference
376
with neighbors’ enjoyment and use of their land. It is a tort regime
forcing owners to internalize the neighborhood costs of their land-use
decisions, thereby assuring efficient uses. It is thus directly set to
replace the contractual neighborhood-land-use regime that

372. This underlying justification is sometimes explicit. Thus, for example, Madison,
Wisconsin’s lawn ordinance, requiring all landowners to not allow their lawns to exceed eight
inches in height, enables an owner to have a “natural lawn”: a lawn for which this restriction
does not apply. However, to have a natural lawn, the landowner must obtain a special permit,
which is granted only if a majority of neighborhood owners do not object. MADISON, WIS.,
ORDINANCE § 27.05(2)(f)(5).
373. Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 109 A. 653, 656 (Pa. 1920).
374. See Hesse v. Century Home Components, 514 P.2d 871, 873 (Or. 1973).
375. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 356 (4th ed. 1971).
376. See supra note 204.
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transaction costs forestall. The tort is sometimes explicitly viewed in
these terms. Michigan Community Resources and the Michigan
Municipal League, for example, developed in 2011 a nuisance-based
legal program to help communities in Detroit hold their members
responsible for the harms they inflict on local morale and property
values through neglect. Neighborhood groups can gather information
on neglectful owners in their midst and report them to a nonprofit
378
legal organization that then files nuisance claims against the owners.
This role of the nuisance tort, as preserver of common neighborhood
interests, is even more pronounced in the law of public nuisances. As
one court explained, the doctrine of public nuisance “aim[s] at the
protection and redress of community interests and, at least in theory,
379
embodies a kind of collective ideal of civil life.”
3. Legal Rules Imposing the Duty To Maintain that Indirectly
Institute the Hypothetical Contract. The negligence and nuisance rules
just reviewed directly institute a legally constructed, mutually
beneficial, neighborhood agreement replacing the actual agreement
for internalizing costs that neighbors cannot negotiate themselves.
The doctrines of eminent domain, building codes, negligence liability
toward trespassers, improving trespasser, and adverse possession
achieve the same socially desirable goal indirectly. Unlike the
negligence and nuisance doctrines already reviewed, these doctrines
formally balance the interests of the owner and actors other than her
neighbors—namely, the government or entrants to her land. Still,
their actual focus is mostly on protecting neighbors by incentivizing
the owner to maintain. Thereby, these doctrines are also mechanisms
for instituting the hypothetical, mutually beneficial, neighborhood
maintenance agreement.
This is easiest to see in eminent domain and building codes. The
governmental exercise of the eminent-domain power is often tailored
380
to protect surrounding properties from blight’s effects. Building

377. Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 762 (1973).
378. For more information, see MICH. MUN. LEAGUE, Community Driven Nuisance
Abatement, available at http://placemaking.mml.org/community-driven-nuisance-abatement/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
379. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997).
380. Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 1883 (2007) (“Why might condemning blighted property . . . be acceptable, whereas
condemning non-blighted property is not? . . . [B]ecause the owner of blighted property is
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codes serve a similar purpose, as legislators admitted in the post-2008
381
recession years. Indeed, neighboring property owners are often
those responsible for the city’s eventual action against properties that
382
are in violation of the code, and a few statutes explicitly allow
neighbors to independently pursue legal action against a code
383
violator.
The indirect way in which liability toward trespassers, adverse
possession, and improving trespasser doctrines indirectly replace a
mutually beneficial, reciprocal promise to maintain made between
neighbors, is less conspicuous and requires some elucidation. Liability
toward trespassers is technically geared toward forcing an owner to
internalize costs experienced by entrants to her land. But it mostly
benefits neighbors of the land by incentivizing an owner to eradicate
dangerous conditions or make her land inaccessible, thereby
eliminating externalities neighbors would otherwise experience. It
also benefits neighbors slightly more directly. Trespassers are most
likely to be neighbors—especially neighboring children attracted to
384
the “attractive nuisance.” Furthermore, liability frequently hinges
on others’ vicinity in that no other factor more easily renders the
trespasser foreseeable, and thus eligible for protection. For example,
trespassers were foreseeable when a furrow was in a lot abutting a
385
386
school, when land served as recreational grounds for neighbors,
and when a railroad was situated amid a populated area and residents
387
routinely walked along it. The practical result of such holdings is
that negligence liability toward trespassers is likelier when neighbors
are prone to be affected by the owner’s neglect—that is, when neglect

imposing harm on neighboring properties. The taking of blighted property, therefore, can serve
as an appropriate collective response to harm-causing or immoral behavior . . . .”).
381. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929.3(b) (West 2012); MADISON, WIS., ORDINANCE
§ 27.05(2)(f) (requiring owners to maintain their property in a way that will enhance “the
appearance and value of the neighborhood”).
382. For example, consider the facts in DMK Acquisitions & Props. v. New Orleans, 124 So.
3d 1157, 1162 (La. Ct. App. 2013). Here, community members complained to the city about the
undermaintained house, and later provided testimony in court regarding multiple code
violations. Id.
383. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-31-1(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2014) (awarding the right
to institute an action to those residing within 1200 feet of the building).
384. E.g., Bransom’s Adm’r v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638, 643 (1884).
385. Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 95 A.2d 388, 390 (N.J. 1953).
386. Webster v. Culbertson, 761 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. 1988); Wytupeck v. City of Camden,
136 A.2d 887, 894–95 (N.J. 1957).
387. First Nat’l Bank v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 865 S.W.2d 719, 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
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produces externalities they feel—and thus it is in these situations that
an owner is incentivized to maintain her land.
Improving trespasser and adverse possession rules, which
formally serve the interests of possessors, not neighbors, similarly
incentivize the owner who seeks immunity from such possessors to
exercise her title by maintaining the property, thereby sparing
neighbors from costs. Indeed, throughout their history, these
doctrines often targeted neglected lands and absentee owners for
388
particularly harsh treatment. If the incentive these doctrines provide
to owners to maintain their land, and thereby safeguard the interests
of neighbors, proves ineffective, the doctrines can force transfer of
title to the possessor who maintains the land. This is often a neighbor
389
who actually maintained the land or constructed something on it.
But even if title shifts to a stranger who maintained the previously
neglected land, neighbors stand to benefit from improved upkeep by
the new owner.
Adverse possession in particular is a radical legal doctrine
“specifying procedures for a productive user to take title from an
390
unproductive user.” Perhaps the best way to explain in utilitarian
terms the need for these procedures is to acknowledge their benefits
to neighbors. Otherwise, it is hard to legitimize the necessity to
bypass market tools through which the productive (or maintaining)
user should have entered a purchase agreement with the
391
unproductive user-owner. This Article’s reconceptualization of
adverse possession as part of the duty to maintain may help in solving
this puzzle. The reason an actual agreement between the formal
owner and the possessor is not reached, despite its social benefits, is
that the benefit of maintaining the land is not fully experienced by the

388. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011)
(explaining that the rationale for protecting improving trespassers has historically been the
promotion of the active use of neglected lands); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Sonia Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1110–13 (2007) (reporting jurisdictions that directly penalized
absentee owners, making it easier for squatters to adversely possess undeveloped lands).
389. SINGER, supra note 102, at 163 (“[M]ost disputes covered by the law of adverse
possession are border disputes . . . .”).
390. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 154 (5th ed. 2007).
391. See Fennell, supra note 10, at 1073–76 (noting the problem, and suggesting that the only
way for adverse possession law to promote efficiency is by requiring that the user have acted in
bad faith); Stewart Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 81–82
(1987) (theorizing that an improver’s failure to negotiate the purchase of the land from an
owner provides evidence that the owner has a higher valuation of the land than the improver).
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adverse possessor—it is felt by the entire neighborhood.
Consequently the adverse possessor does not offer the owner a price
393
representing the full benefit of transferring the land to her. To
overcome these transaction costs and compel the internalization of
maintenance’s benefits, adverse possession forces the land’s transfer
to the maintaining possessor.
Adverse possession thus finds a strong justification as a
mechanism replacing the unattainable, mutually beneficial,
neighborhood contract to maintain all lands. Along with eminent
domain, building codes, liability toward trespassers, and improving
trespasser, this doctrine, although formally pursuing other purposes,
imposes a duty to maintain that indirectly leads owners to internalize
the neighborhood costs of their land-use decisions. As with the other
doctrines instituting the hypothetical neighborhood contract to
maintain, adverse possession is thus an element of an efficient
property law system.
4. The Scope of the Hypothetical Contract. The utilitarian
property theory, animating the doctrines just reviewed, demands that
decisions regarding the use of resources engender efficient results.
For that purpose, the costs of neglect experienced by others must be
imposed on the owner who otherwise, due to the inadequacy of
contractual tools, ignores them. This utilitarian rationale, as seen so
far, accounts for the reach of the duty to maintain in property law. It
also explains the duty’s outer limit.
Given that the legal imposition of costs through the duty to
maintain is justified in utilitarian terms as a hypothetical contract
replacing the actual contract parties would have entered, the duty
only encompasses costs parties inarguably experience, and undeniably
392. Of course the incentive of a possessor, who knows she does not own the land, to
maintain it for her benefit and for that of the neighborhood, is to some extent always blunted by
the owner’s ability to bring an ejection suit before the limitation period runs out. Such a suit will
be accepted unless the possessor prevails under the flexible, and hence unpredictable, doctrine
of improving trespasser.
393. The transaction costs cited as blocking a deal between the possessor and the true owner
are associated with the inability of the possessor to identify and locate a true owner who is
passive, and presumably absent. E.g. Thomas Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130–31 (1984). Minimum maintenance of the land
or other acts on it serves as a signal aiding potential market players in identifying the owner.
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79–81 (1985). This
argument is not as compelling as the one suggested in this Article because the true owner is, by
definition, the record owner, who can be located through a simple title search, and hence,
identification costs are unlikely to form the main cause for the market failure.
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would like to see controlled. The doctrines imposing the duty are
therefore minimal. They limit their range to actual neglect or
disregard, which, as explained, inevitably generates objective
externalities that neighbors feel. These doctrines create a duty to
maintain property, not to beautify property. The law forbids the
owner from neglecting her land, but does not prevent her from
turning it ugly. “It is generally recognized that unsightliness, without
394
more, does not create an actionable [claim].” Even when the
aesthetic impact of unsightliness decreases the value of neighboring
395
properties, a claim in law does not materialize. An added element—
such as objective neglect—must be present.
Neglect is inherently different from unsightliness. Preferences
respecting aesthetics are subjective, and thus, as courts explain, the
regulation of aesthetic harms and benefits should be left to actual, not
hypothetical, contracts between neighbors. In other words, it should
be left to covenants. When neighbors challenge an owner’s design
choice that did not breach a contract between them, the court is asked
396
to act as an arbiter of taste, a role generating great confusion.
Conversely, when an owner’s choice to neglect her property is
challenged, and the neglect results in odors, noise, dangerous
conditions, et cetera, the court is not asked to arbitrate subjective
tastes. As harms are uncontestable, the court can establish a rather
predictable and consensual standard by which all owners must abide.
In these cases, courts can more easily substitute their own judgment
for the judgment of the parties that would have been expressed in an
397
agreement had transaction costs been absent.
In utilitarian analysis, property law should do exactly that. It
should intervene to rectify market failures when private decisions do
not take full account of social costs and benefits. It should replace
actual agreements interest-holders desire but cannot attain due to
hurdles that block bargaining. The duty to maintain performs this

394. Ness v. Albert, 665 S.W.2d 1, 1–2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also Haehlen v. Wilson, 54
P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. 1984); Jillson v.
Barton, 229 S.E.2d 476, 477–78 (1975).
395. Rankin v. FPL Energy, 266 S.W.3d 506, 510–12 (Tex. App. 2008).
396. Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973); Wernke v. Halas, 600
N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
397. See Parkersburg Builders Material v. Barrack, 191 S.E. 368, 371 (1937) (“[E]quity
should not be aroused to action merely on the basis of the fastidiousness of taste of
complainants. Equity should act only where there is presented a situation which is offensive to
the view of the average persons of the community.”).

SHOKED IN PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

11/18/2014 6:30 PM

THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN

507

function in many of its disparate manifestations reviewed in Part II
and analyzed here, namely, negligence duties toward outsiders,
private and public nuisance, eminent domain, building codes,
negligence liability toward trespassers, improving trespasser, and
adverse possession. The duty to maintain materializes as the only
legal mechanism capable of instituting the desired mutual assurance
between neighbors that they will all maintain their lands so as not to
suffer the neighborhood effects of an owner’s decision to neglect.
C. Elements of the Duty To Maintain Explained by Relational
Property Theories
By replacing actual contracts with hypothetical ones as
justification for a duty to maintain, utilitarian explanations account
for most of the doctrines reviewed in Part II, whose logic eluded
right-based explanations. However, one doctrine reviewed in Part II
explicitly supersedes contracts parties create, and thus cannot be
viewed as emanating from an agreement they would have freely
reached had transaction costs been absent. Rules applying the duty in
landlord–tenant law unequivocally announce their goal to circumvent
owners’ desires and to promote the interests of one group of
individuals (tenants) at the expense of another (landlords). These
rules are not based on the reciprocity-of-advantages idea that
animates rules protecting neighbors. There, as seen, the duty to
maintain was based on the assumption that if assured their neighbors
will do the same, all owners will prefer to maintain their lands. Here
the assumption is the opposite: in all conditions, all owners who are
landlords will prefer to be free to neglect.
Current law still enforces on owners who are landlords a duty to
maintain, which can only be explained through the third group of
property theories: relational theories. Although these theories place a
premium on the owner’s freedom and self-determination achieved
through ownership, they do so as part of their celebration of desirable
social relationships. Consequently, like the utilitarian theories, they
embrace duties to maintain that subject an owner to reciprocal
obligations toward other owners that sustain the healthy, neighborly
relations that permit all owners to enjoy their property and flourish,
free of neglect’s threat.
But relational justifications go beyond utilitarian justifications.
Due to the belief that property must sustain desirable relationships,
as reviewed in Part I.A.3, relational theories value the expansion of
opportunities for self-determination, even at the expense of existing
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owners’ liberty or of overall social welfare. Therefore, relational
theories sometimes require owners to surrender portions of their
freedom not to mutually benefit other owners with whom they
entertain a relationship based on equality and reciprocity (such as
neighbors), but to enable non-owners to enjoy the freedom property
affords. A particularly compelling reason under relational theories to
force an owner to part ways with some of her freedom in favor of
another’s emerges when two conditions are met: the owner is in a
398
relationship with another interest-holder who is dependent on her,
399
and the owner voluntarily entered this relationship.
Because relational theories focus on desirable and fair
relationships, they require property law to protect the limited
freedom of those who, through property relationships, are
400
economically dependent on other owners. If the latter choose to use
the property system to establish a position from which they derive a
benefit from the weakness and dependence of others, property law
401
may—and should—limit their freedom to abuse the relationship.
The quintessential example for such a relationship of dependence is
402
the landlord–tenant relationship. The landlord is the propertyholder and thus the stronger actor, whereas the tenant depends on
her for shelter. Given that the landlord was never forced to become a
landlord, but rather opted to enter the housing market in quest of
profits, it is just to force her to provide a well-maintained shelter and
398. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 75, at 771.
399. Singer, supra note 98, at 666–67 (explaining that “[i]t is morally wrong for the true
owner to allow a relationship of dependence to be established and then to cut off the dependent
party,” and therefore, adverse possession is justifiable). Peñalver & Alexander, supra note 341,
at 149–54 (employing a similar framework to analyze State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J.
1971)).
400. See ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 80–81 (1983)
(explaining that relations of interdependence create duties in private law).
401. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 326–27 (1986) (“[P]rivate law is a
relatively seamless area in which the society, speaking primarily through the courts, assigns
rights and duties based on relationships among people and firms, in light of many factors,
among them the particular community needs, the needs of the parties themselves, their relative
power, fairness among them and their assent.” (footnote omitted)); see also Bruce Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1171 (1971)
(raising the issue of whether slum landlords must carry special redistributive burdens with
respect to their tenants).
402. Ackerman, supra note 401, at 1172 (arguing that landlords should be subject to the
warranty of habitability because they chose to embark on a continuing relationship with tenants,
thereby weaving the maldistribution of income into the fabric of their lives and market
activities).
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to conserve the relationship with the specific tenant who depends on
her. Only in this manner can the tenant’s freedom be protected. It is
only by imposing a duty to maintain on those who choose to benefit
from others’ dependence that property can contribute to forming and
sustaining the social relations necessary for human flourishing.
D. Summary: Revisiting the Debate over Lenders’ Responsibilities
The claim that ownership encompasses the right to let land lie
fallow or gather dust is not merely descriptive, but also normative. As
seen in Part I, all property theories agree that private property was
instituted to promote freedom. How can the owner thus be denied the
most basic freedom, that of choosing to do nothing? How can she be
forced to act? This Part has shown, however, that in fact all property
justifications require, for different reasons and to varying extents, that
ownership place on the owner a duty to maintain, which limits her
freedom. Right-based theories require the enforcement of a duty
when current or antecedent owners have entered an agreement that
can be interpreted as imposing it. Utilitarian theories require the duty
even in the absence of an agreement if an agreement would have
been reached had transaction costs not been present. Relational
theories require the duty even in the absence of an actual or
hypothetical agreement when the relationship between the parties is
grounded in an imbalance of power utilized by the stronger party to
derive an economic benefit and further limit the dependent party’s
freedom. In light of one or more of these justifications, all current
doctrines imposing the duty to maintain, reviewed in Part II, are
warranted. An owner not only lacks the freedom to let her land lie
fallow or gather dust, she should lack it. The adherents of different
property theories will dispute the details of the specific limits placed
on that freedom, but none should question the desirability of limits.
This conclusion aids in rethinking the prevailing, and generally
dismissive, attitude toward affirmative obligations in property law
and the embrace of the trope that an owner has a right to let land lie
fallow or gather dust, presented in Part I. It should also serve to
remedy specific detrimental effects of that trope. The new
understanding of the doctrinal place occupied by the duty to maintain
in American law, and of the duty’s normative function, should inform
legislators and judges as they tackle new questions in property law.
As an example of the practical implications of the theoretical findings
elaborated on in this Part, these concluding pages will revisit the
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hostile approach of contemporary courts to new maintenance
obligations enforced against lenders.
As surveyed in Part I.D, this attitude owes to a belief that
holders of interests in property enjoy the freedom to ignore that
property. Yet, as Part II of this Article illustrated by exposing the
profusion of property rules enforcing a duty to maintain, the common
law contains no such freedom. The disapproving attitude toward new
statutory duties imposed on lien holders over neglected properties
stands in stark contrast to the realities of American law. These
realities are not new, but have been a constant in American law. As
seen in Part I.C, affirmative duties in property law are often
disfavored, as they are conceived as feudal practices alien to liberal
Anglo-American law. In fact, however, as Part II revealed, such
duties have always formed a key element in liberal Anglo-American
law.
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that throughout American
history, legislative initiatives were embraced to reinforce the capacity
of the duty to maintain to combat specific ills—similar to those
targeted today by measures directed at lenders—as they periodically
emerged. As soon as colonization commenced, American law
required owners to work and improve their lands, appropriating the
land if they did not. These early laws explicitly referred to the social
403
harms that deserted lands could generate. Other laws enacted at the
time required owners to fence their lands, and appointed “fence
watchers” to enforce compliance through fines and other sanctions
against those who failed to thereby secure their lands or allowed
404
fences to fall into disrepair. Later, nineteenth-century American law
disfavored absentee owners who left their lands fallow, and often
405
transferred title to those who rescued such lands from neglect. In
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court stated: “a legislature
generally has the power to . . . condition [property rights’] continued
406
retention on performance of certain affirmative duties.”

403. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–63 (1996).
404. FAREN R. SIMINOFF, CROSSING THE SOUND: THE RISE OF ATLANTIC AMERICAN
COMMUNITIES IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EASTERN LONG ISLAND 38 (2004); Bethany R.
Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1112–
13 (2006).
405. See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 388, at 1109–14.
406. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985).
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A strict duty to maintain applied to lenders conforms not only to
these past practices of American property law and to the many
present ones reviewed in Part II, but also to the duty’s justification
under two of the three theories of property as developed in this Part
of the Article. Both utilitarian and relational theories find no
normative cause to distinguish lenders from owners when enforcing
duties to maintain vacant lots.
For utilitarians, the duty to maintain neglected properties in
foreclosure is a socially desirable mechanism for internalizing
neighborhood externalities that bargaining cannot handle. As
detailed in Part II.B, neglected properties carry detrimental effects
407
for all nearby property owners. They also, as a result, negatively
impact the lenders who rely on these properties as security for credit
408
they issue. In accordance, contracts whereby all those who hold
interests in properties in a neighborhood mutually agree to assure
minimum maintenance of those properties will benefit all parties.
Yet, due to the transaction costs reviewed in Part III.B.1, neighbors
and lenders cannot realistically be expected to enter such contracts
409
restricting neglect before it occurs. Later, during foreclosure, such
contracts are blocked by added transaction costs as owners of
properties in foreclosure are often long-gone, and lenders have no
reason to announce their identity, which, in the highly segmented
410
mortgage market, neighbors cannot discern. The unattainable
maintenance agreement between all owners and all lenders should be
replaced, according to utilitarianism, with a duty to maintain legally
411
imposed on all of them.

407. See supra notes 319–26 and accompanying text.
408. There are thus grounds to question the First Circuit Court of Appeals’s conclusion that
lenders are not beneficiaries of a maintenance ordinance whose purpose is neighborhood
preservation. See Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2013)
(holding the “true beneficiaries” of a maintenance ordinance are “mortgagors and the public at
large”).
409. See supra notes 367–70 and accompanying text.
410. See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 11
(2011) (explaining how mortgages are generally financed through securitization).
411. Lenders’ arguments that maintenance duties will render credit more expensive or
harder to price are unpersuasive. First, the duty’s reciprocal nature will reduce the risk that
lenders’ securities will lose value due to neighboring properties’ neglect, and the cost of credit
should adjust downwards accordingly. Second, because ownership always carried the duty to
maintain, lenders could, and probably did, at least partially already price the duty’s costs when
setting interest rates. Third, lenders already require owners to carry homeowners insurance,
which covers many liabilities the duty imposes.
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This duty is also justified through relational theories. For these
theories the lender’s duty to maintain is the necessary upshot of the
special relationship that exists between a lender and the community
in whose midst the mortgaged property is located. Lenders are more
powerful than other housing-market participants—the owners to
whom they lend and their neighbors. Owners and communities
depend on lenders, who voluntarily involve themselves in the housing
market to derive benefits from their position. Therefore, as seen in
Part III.C, and as Congress argued in a similar context, there is a
relational justification to subject lenders to an obligation to protect
412
communities that depend on them.
Because of the strong normative justifications for applying the
duty to maintain in these cases, as well as the history and present
structure of American law which render the duty inherent to
property, there is no reason to insist that a maintenance responsibility
only apply to an interest holder—in this case, a mortgagee—after it
takes formal title to the land. When assessed as part of the law and
policy of the duty to maintain exposed in this Article, the expansion
of lenders’ responsibilities must be judged uncontroversial.
CONCLUSION
Edith Beale, known as “Big Edie,” was an early twentiethcentury socialite. She owned Grey Gardens, a big old mansion in a
tony neighborhood in East Hampton, New York, where she lived
with her daughter, “Little Edie.” Following the dissolution of her
marriage, Big Edie did not invest in the grounds’ upkeep. More than
thirty years of complete neglect left the house decrepit with raccoons
roaming the halls, garbage mounting throughout, ceilings and walls
413
crumbling, and more. Consequently, in 1972, the relevant local
government, Suffolk County, issued an eviction order. While Big Edie
argued that no one had the right to order her to do anything on her
land, the county argued that her inactivity as an owner generated
major costs for her neighbors and for the county.
412. Similar reasoning led to the adoption of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901–2907 (2006), which requires banks to “meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered.” The legislators who enacted the Act believed that
banks were under a duty to reinvest in the communities from which they draw deposits. See
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV.
291, 298 (1993) (explaining that “redlining” improperly funnels financial resources out of “areas
in which the funds are gathered”).
413. Gail Sheehy, The Secret of Grey Gardens, N.Y. MAG., Jan. 10, 1972.
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Luckily, Big Edie was an aunt of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis,
who arranged for the necessary renovations. As a result, the story of
Grey Gardens ended up playing out as a documentary on movie
414
415
screens, as a musical on the Broadway stage, and as a movie on
416
television sets, rather than as a legal dispute in courts. The story’s
artistic versions celebrated the eccentricities of the two protagonists,
Big and Little Edie. The legal story, had it unfolded, would have
exemplified the fact that property law, although aimed at forming for
individuals a realm of privacy to freely pursue their eccentricities, also
curbs this freedom of eccentricity.
An owner is free to pursue her idiosyncratic wishes respecting
her land, as long as she minimally maintains that land. Property law
does not force an owner to grow any specific crops on her land; it
does not force her to use an asset in a specific way. But it also does
not permit an owner to leave her land fallow; it does not enable her to
sit back as her asset gathers dust. That legal reality, heretofore
unacknowledged by scholars, was borne out by the experiences of Big
Edie in the 1970s and of the Detroit properties put on sale for one
dollar in the 2010s. Ownership encompasses obligations, including
affirmative obligations to maintain the land. It always has. It should.

414. GREY GARDENS (Portrait Films 1976).
415. GREY GARDENS: THE COMPLETE BOOK AND LYRICS OF THE BROADWAY MUSICAL
(2007).
416. Grey Gardens (HBO television broadcast Apr. 18, 2009).

